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This thesis aims to examine how the March 15th, 2004 law prohibiting all “ostentatious” religious 
signs and symbols in public schools in France, despite targeting all religious outfits in its 
labeling, might lead to a significant negative impact on French Muslim populations. This thesis 
reaches mixed conclusions. I find that there was initial extensive mediatic and political focus on 
the headscarf brought a strongly negative image of the veil, which constituted a trigger for the 
establishment of the law. I also discuss the ambiguity of the concept of laïcité allowed for an 
application of the law that is equal yet “indirectly” unfair to French Muslim schoolgirls, and even 
affecting Muslim women wearing the veil outside of schools. Finally, I find that the subjectivity 
of the concept of “conspicuousness” on which the 2004 law relies allows for unfairness of 
application. It does not constitute decisive evidence to draw an answer about whether the law 
directly made Muslims worse off and more likely to be discriminated, yet this same evidence 
points in that direction. In my conclusion, I draw out policy recommendations based on the 
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I –  INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXTUAL POINTS 
1.1. Introduction 
If many know the “Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité” national motto inscribed on top of every 
French town hall, the principle of Laïcité is not something often known in depth outside of French 
borders. Laïcité can be said to be an old legal, social and political pillar of the French Republic. 
Dating from a law instituted in 1905 during France’s Third Republic, it stands as the principle 
assuring the strict separation between the French state and churches, as a conclusion to years of 
debates dividing the Parliament between a strong Republican faction – composed of powerful anti-
clerical voices – and a more conservative, pro-Catholic Church constituency. Even if it established 
a democratic cornerstone of the French Republic, the 1905 law was originally inscribed in a context 
of agitated debates and strident opposition.  The principle of laïcité is used again as the basis of 
more controversial laws, notably the March 15th, 2004 law on conspicuous religious signs and 
symbols in public schools, that forbids pupils to wear any visible sign that shows religious 
appurtenance or belief. It is on laïcité and this specific law that this thesis focuses on. In fact, as 
France’s Muslim population feels increasingly marginalized, as several debates on the 
compatibility between Islam and French values regularly punctuate the French media, (like the 
latest burkini controversy illustrates), this thesis aims to question the utilization of the laïcité 
principle by the French state in today’s politics. Even if it aims to neutralize the public space of 
any religious influence, the 2004 law is known as the “veil law” in France, highlighting the ways 
in which this law might disproportionately be associated with the Muslim hijab. I argue that the 
2004 law, in its application is “weaponized” against Muslims to a certain extent, and affects them 
disproportionately compared to other religious communities, by observing how the kind of 
universalist language used in the application of the 2004 law might be hurting French Muslims. 
This thesis uses analysis of current literature, qualitative interviews and quantitative surveys in 
order to assess the ways and to what extent in which the language used when the 2004 law is 
applied affects Muslim populations in France. 
1.2. Research Question and Hypothesis 
Understanding in which ways the universalist language of the 2004 law, combined with 
debates, political discussions and media attention specifically focused on Muslim and the Muslim 
veil have influenced the ways in which French attitudes towards Muslim religious expression in 
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public spaces. The main question of this thesis is the following: how did the 2004 law on the 
prohibition of religious symbols in public schools, despite the universal language it uses, 
disproportionally affect French Muslim populations? It is quite a complex question indeed. In fact, 
I analyze the links between different variables in order to answer to that question. They are 
summarized in the model below: 
 Model 1: Central hypothesis.  
 
Before explaining the different relations between variables I aim to analyze in this thesis, 
I want to define certain terms. In this model, I distinguish “islamophobic opinions/attitudes” from 
“discrimination sentiment”. I define the former as the French public’s opinions on Islam becoming 
less tolerant/open/warier of Islam and Muslims, Muslims (more likely to support statements or 
policies that view Muslims as non-French, that would differentiate Muslims from the rest of French 
citizens) as well as any attitudes they could have towards Muslims or external expressions of 
Muslim faith (e.g. a company refusing to hire Muslims or Muslim women who wear the veil). On 
a moral ground, some might disagree as to whether discriminating against a Muslim woman 
wearing the veil in the context of an hiring process can be considered as islamophobic. While this 
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thesis does not intend to be a debate on the definition of islamophobia, I intend to define 
islamophobia using the French definition given by the Larousse Dictionary, one of the many 
dictionaries equivalent to the American Merriam-Webster: “islamophobie, nom féminin: Hostilité 
envers l'islam, les musulmans.” [Islamophobia, female noun: hostility against Islam, Muslims] 
(Larousse) – and allow this definition at large include actions that specifically target Islam, 
Muslims as well as any external expressions of faith (e.g. wearing of the veil, construction of a 
mosque, halal menus in restaurants or school cafeterias) Whether or not some external expressions 
should be regulated or banned for the sake of public order is still a matter of debate, and they will 
be included in my larger definition of “islamophobic opinions/attitudes” (from typical citizens) 
unless they make the object of a specific law. 
Concerning the definition of “discrimination sentiment,” I define it as a sentiment of 
marginalization, victimization, and overall lack of well-being felt by French Muslims concerning 
their place as Muslims (practicing or not) in French society. Whether it is a justified sentiment or 
not is also another debate that will not be tackled in this thesis, As I aim to simply provide the 
reader with a sample “temperature” of Muslim well-being in France, knowing whether or not their 
sentiment is justifiable is not part of my goal.  
1.3. Motivation 
There has been substantial literature on laïcité, and on the 2004 law, whether it is to criticize 
the current application of laïcité through a political theory lens (Laborde), or to address the constant 
problematizing of Muslim garments and symbols by French politicians and the media (Nakad). 
Similar literature exists concerning the complex relations between laïcité and French Islam (Roy) 
but I have observed that the literature addressing French Muslims’ perception of the 2004 law 
wasn’t as frequent or popular. Even if many authors have been addressing the issues posed by 
French application of laïcité, notably in its application of the 2004 law, I felt like there was a gap 
to filled in regards to understanding and measuring the impact on French Muslim compared to 
other populations. What is their position vis-à-vis of the law? Do they feel more or less negatively 
or positively impacted by the law? Are there differences of impact observed in different 
demographics (e.g. age, gender, etc.)? Moreover, as a French citizen myself, I have observed the 
emergence of identity issues on the political stage. France is soon electing its next president, and 
the question of the compatibility between French Republican values and Islam has become a topic 
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repeated on political and media stages, accompanied with controversies like the recent burkini 
scandal, I realize it is important to understand the point of view of Muslims on the question and to 
question the ways in which the principle of laïcité is currently interpreted by politicians, and by 
the people in charge of applying the 2004 law (teachers, school staff, policemen, etc.)  
 
1.4. Laïcité: History and Current Context 
  “La République assure la liberté de conscience. Elle garantit le libre exercice des cultes 
sous les seules restrictions édictées ci-après dans l'intérêt de l'ordre public,” [“1 “The Republic 
guarantees freedom of conscience. It guarantees the free exercise of religions under the only 
restrictions enacted hereunder in the interest of public order.”] writes the very first article of the 
French law enacted on December 9th 1905. (Legifrance 1905) This law, in French legal history, is 
the one on which the essential principle of laïcité rests, and on which several laws concerning the 
regulation of religious behavior and presentation rely on, including the March 15th 2004 law on 
conspicuous religious symbols in public schools that is at the center of this thesis. In order to 
understand the legal and social framework of the 2004 law, it is necessary to first and foremost 
understand the social and political context of laïcité, both at its creation in the 19th century as a 
legal and political major concept of the French Republic, but also during the 1990s and 2000s, 
when arose the controversies and debates that led to the establishment of the 2004 law. This portion 
will then be reserved to explain the context necessary to understand the environment and factors 
that led to the birth of a form of secularity “a la française”.  
1.4.1 Laïcité: a principle constructed around State-Church struggles 
The word “laïcité” first made its appearance in the French Dictionary Dictionnaire Littré 
in 1871 through its adjectival version “laïque”, defined as “conception politique et sociale 
impliquant la separation de l’Eglise et de l’Etat.”1 (Khalifa 55) As a concept in French, the word 
“laïcité” simultaneously designates the larger idea of separation between religious institutions and 
the State and the particular French legal and political regimen concerning the application of this 
idea. During the second half of the 19th century, France underwent a series of legal, political and 
social reforms that saw confrontations between the Catholic Church, the most preeminent religious 
                                                 
1 “Political and social conception involving a separation between the Church and the State.” 
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institution at the time, and the French Assembly that established the legal foundations of laïcité. It 
is necessary to understand the historical context and the confrontational relationship between the 
State and the religious institutions existing within the French territory. In fact, it will allow to grasp 
the ways in which laïcité was built and used at its creation, not just to ensure freedom of conscience 
and Church-State separation, but also to directly oppose specifically religious influence of the 
Catholic Church at the end of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th. 
The history of laïcité is inscribed in a longer history of a relation of control of the French 
State over religious institutions – and notably the Catholic Church – that, according to Jean 
Baubérot, can be traced back to the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. King Philippe le Bel 
initiated a tradition of church regulation when he initiated the tradition of controlling the French 
Catholic Church from the palace. (Bowen 21) In fact, when in Anglo-Saxon political culture, 
religious tolerance was a matter of “recognition of freedom of conscience,” the French political 
culture allowed tolerance as the “regulation of a recognized religion”. (22) It is this model of state 
regulation of the church that dominated the French political sphere until the late nineteenth century. 
Yet, with the French Revolution of 1789 came an antireligious current of thought, even if towards 
the beginning of the nineteenth century, nearly all French citizens belonged to the Catholic Church 
(23). Throughout the century, the relations between State and Church oscillated between regimes 
that were acceding to the Church’s social, political and legal demands (i.e. as the July Monarchy 
of 1830-1848), regimes that aimed to establish a new form of State control over the Catholic 
Church (i.e. the 1801 Concordat through the Napoleonic Empire), or Republican regimes planning 
a form of secularization and State-Church separation. (23-24) This back-and-forth between control, 
allowance and secularization was also illustrated legally: divorce, which was allowed during the 
Revolution, was forbidden in 1816, then reauthorized in 1884. (24) Tensions between supporters 
of Church control in public affairs and proponents of anticlericalism grew, and found its climax in 
the debates that raged during the Third Republic (1870-1940) Throughout the Third Republic, the 
Republicans, dominating the government and the Assembly, supported a secularizing stance, 
seeing the Catholic Church as a threat to republicanism, and the principles of modernity and 
progress they upheld. Léon Gambetta, major political figure at the time, talks about the necessity 
of building a new political order, “away from and above of the dogmas and the practices of 
different religious confessions.” (Portier 91)  
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The field of education notably becomes a battlefield opposing the Church and the State, the 
latter aiming to reduce the former’s influence. In public schools, religion still occupied a large role, 
with mandatory morning prayers and religious instruction taught by priests once a week. (Piettre 
30) Under the Falloux law of 1850, the Church was allowed a larger place in education, to the 
disagreement of Republicans. The Third Republic begins its secularization of school by creating a 
new school curriculum teaching a new form of morality, drawing on Christian philosophy, but also 
Kant and Confucius. (Bowen 24)  
But the Ferry laws implemented between 1882 and 1886 represent the strongest blow given 
from the State to the Church’s place in education: education is declared to be free, mandatory and 
“laïque” (secular) in public schools throughout the territory. For the first time, education is drawn 
as the public space in which “the Church could not go,” and Jules Ferry, then minister of public 
instruction, is painted as a “Republican hero”. (25) Since then, the French Republican legacy has 
been represented as a combat against the Church (and other religion’s) influence on young minds. 
As Bowen writes, this episode in French history helps to explain how several teachers and 
intellectuals [and I would add, politicians] see the presence of Islam in schools as a menace to the 
two Republican struggles of the Third Republic: “the fight to keep religion from controlling young 
minds, and the struggle to forge a common French identity.” (25)  
1.4.2. The establishment of the 1905 law 
The law of December 9th, 1905 concerning the separation of Churches and State, composed of 
forty-four articles in its latest version, is the legal foundation of the current French model of 
secularism. Discussed in the National Assembly from March 21st to July 3rd 1905, its text was the 
object of one of the longest debates in parliamentary meetings in France (Unger 11) It settles the 
disputes between the Catholic Church and the State that last throughout the Third Republic, 
disputes that had reached a new level of intensity with the Dreyfus affair (1898-1899), which 
brought a new bone of contention opposing anticlericals and proponents of the Church. Its first 
article inscribes “freedom of conscience and free exercise of organized religions”, and its second 
guarantees that the State “neither recognizes nor pays the salaries of, nor subsidizes any religion” 
(Bowen 26), although additional provisions allow citizens to recognize religious institutions and 
bodies as private religious associations that own and operate buildings, and enjoy tax exemptions. 
Reading from the terms of the 1905 law, Olivier Bobineau and Stéphane Lathion distinguish four 
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types of laïcité present in the legal text: a “laïcité de proposition” (66), a “laïcité de differentiation” 
(69), a “laïcité d’opposition” (71), and a “laïcité de composition” (72). If the 1905 law is dominated 
by the “laïcité de proposition”, which aims to make laïcité the tool to manage the coexistence of 
religions in civil society (Bobineau & Lathion 66) through its first article, the political context of 
1905 is of a “laïcité d’opposition”, a laïcité that advocates stricter control of the Churches by the 
State, mainly to fight against the Catholic Church’s strong influence in civil society, (71) as we 
have explored in the previous paragraph. 
Other readings of the 1905 law would tend to read the law as not as a “law of combat, but a 
law of pacification” (El-Haggar 41), basing their interpretation on the fact that the law came to be 
established as an accord between different political factions – socialists, radical-socialists, 
moderate republicans, conservative republicans, as well as support coming from civil society 
organizations. The 1905 law is then seen as a law closing the clash between clericalists and 
anticlericalists, and imposing itself as a law of peace. It is indeed important to recognize the 
smoothness of the parliamentary process during the voting of the law, as well as the efficiency of 
the parliamentary commission that drafted the law. In June 1903, a commission composed of 
thirty-three members (17 members of the majority, 16 members of the opposition) is in charge of 
studying eight different bill propositions for what would become the 1905 law, sign of the discord 
and political disagreements surrounding the law project. Aristide Briand, a socialist deputy, 
becomes then the mediator between pro-church right wing and anti-clerical Republicans, and 
manages to rally the two opposing political factions and produces a synthesis of initial proposed 
texts to bring before the Parliament: one single text that will become the 1905 law.  
Yet, the political and social climate at the time of the law’s creation shouldn’t be dismissed so 
quickly when aiming to understand the law. The religious and political climate at the time of the 
law still remained very agitated, and a possible reading of political intentions as “pacifying” does 
not exclude another reading of this law as a law of “combat”. The law of 1905 would not have 
been the object of such a debate at the time without the significant confrontations between 
anticlericalists and supporters of the Church. 
An interesting point to note is that despite being the law introducing the concept of laïcité in 
the French legal sphere (Portier), the word in itself is not at any time mentioned nor defined in the 
legal text of 1905. The legal existence of the word relies on its presence in the first article of the 
1946, then the 1958 Constitution of the current Fifth Republic: “La France est une République 
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indivisible, laïque, démocratique et sociale.” [France is an indivisible, secular, democratic, and 
social Republic.] (Conseil Constitutionnel). Being defined as a fundamental pillar of the Republic, 
the definition of laïcité is however not a universal truth all historians, legal experts and politicians 
agree upon. I refer to John Bowen’s chapter on the “misunderstanding” concerning an exact 
definition of laïcité (32). Following on W.B. Gallie’s definition of an “essentially contested 
concept”, Bowen argues that laïcité remains a “politically useful [term] precisely because it has no 
agreed-on definition” (32), and that despite the historical and legal narratives, there has never been 
a formal agreement “on the role religion should play in public life” (33) A more recent view, shared 
in the French political sphere, expressed by President Jacques Chirac in his December 17th, 2003 
address on religious signs in public schools, views laïcité as “protected, privileged, multifunctional 
social space within which Republican principles could survive and prosper” (29) Political 
researchers, like El-Haggar, share this point of view: they describe laïcité not as a principle 
supposed to make freedoms coexist as they are in a given a society, but as a principle that aims to 
build a space that would be the condition of such a coexistence. (El-Haggar 19) This most recent 
reading would interpret laïcité, rather than an enabler of religious freedoms, as a laïcité-regulator, 
protector of the Republican principles and values in the public space and within public spaces. Yet, 
which exactly are the public spaces that are protected by laïcité? With the 2004 law, the school – 
as a public space regulated by the French State – becomes one of these spaces formally protected 
by the principle of laïcité. It becomes the first law, almost a hundred years after the 1905 law, to 
be promulgated in “application of the principle of laïcité.” (Legifrance 2004)  
1.5. The 2004 law on laïcité and conspicuous religious signs and symbols 
The first article of law No. 2004-228, dating from March 15th, 2004 writes as follows: ““In 
primary and secondary public schools, the wearing of signs or dresses by which pupils ostensibly 
show a religious affiliation is prohibited. Internal rules to the institution recall that the 
implementation of a disciplinary procedure is preceded by a dialogue with the pupil.” This law 
forbids the wearing of any religious signs or clothing by students when present in the premises of 
any primary and secondary public school. The same rule already applied to teachers as well as 
school staff given the terms of the Ferry laws voted in the 1880s. This law concerns any religious 
symbols or clothing present inside public schools, yet an interesting point is that the law is known 
as the “veil law” in the collective conscience and media sphere: a Le Monde article writes on the 
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subject, “From a juridical point of view, she [the law] incorporates all religious symbols, but, in 
the common language, it became “the veil law” (Bronner) This immediate association of a law that 
aimed – at least in its language – to be equally restrictive to all religious symbols to the reality of 
the Islamic hijab is telling. It is then necessary to look and analyze the political and social context 
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II – CONTEXTUALIZING THE LAW: SOCIO-POLITICAL DEBATES 
2.1. The debates surrounding the 2004 law: 1989, first “veil” controversy 
Hanoufa Chérifi, author of an official report in 2005 on the application of the 2004 law, 
brings the origins of the law back to “Créil, September 1989” (30). The Créil case constitutes to 
one of the first instances in which the hijab and its wearing in public schools became the object of 
a debate, in 1989. Another case earlier in the year, in June, was narrated in one newspaper, but 
gathers less attention due to its quick resolution when the parents and the school administration 
reach a consensus early enough (Ottenheimer). In September 1989, three Muslim girls – Samira 
Saidani, of Tunisian origin, and Leila and Fatima Achaboun, sisters of Moroccan origin – students 
in the Gabriel-Havez middle school in the city of Créil, were refused access to classes due to the 
intervention of the school’s principal who states that “the problem isn’t with their belief, but with 
the external manifestation of these beliefs within the school grounds” (INA 1989) The Créil cases 
start bring massive media coverage: major French publications such as L’Humanité, Le Parisien, 
France Soir, Le Monde publish series of articles in the week between Thursday, October 5th and 
Tuesday, October 10th and Le Point publishes in its issue dating from October 16th a 6-page report 
entitled “Should we let Islam inside our schools?” (Le Point 1989) Quickly adopting a pessimistic 
tone, major French press immediately draws a link between the headscarf, Muslim fundamentalism, 
and the immigration wave of the seventies that welcomed millions of immigrants from Muslim-
majority countries that used to be French colonies (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia) 
The Créil case had broader repercussions and becomes an object of support for several anti-
racist associations such as SOS Racisme or the Mouvement contre le racisme et pour l’amitié entre 
les peuples. The minister of Education at the time, Lionel Jospin, supports the position of the 
school administration, stating that the school remains a space where “signs of one’s own religious 
belonging shouldn’t be displayed, in a conspicuous or ostentatious manner” but however affirms 
that “school is made to welcome children and not to exclude them” (Bowen 82)  
 The case itself is settled on October 9th, 1989, when the parents and the school 
administration reach a consensus. Nonetheless, the Créil case opens the door to broad media and 
politic attention on the question of the Islamic veil inside of public schools. Other cases of young 
girls wearing the hijab in public schools not being allowed access into the classroom or inside the 
school campus are being reported in the days following the Créil case. Newspapers start publishing 
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articles and reports on schoolgirls wearing the veil, and even on Islamic schools (Bowen 83). On 
October 22nd, a protest against the decisions of many schools to forbid the wearing of the Islamic 
veil in their grounds is organized in Paris, gathering up to a thousand of protesters according to 
Libération, versus a few hundred according to L’Humanité. Nonetheless, it is still important to 
bring up a question: why did this case emerged in 1989? Why not before, as the veil was being 
worn by Muslim girls beforehand without a form of disapproval coming from school 
administrations as mediatized as the Créil case? A similar case in October 16th concerns a girl 
expulsed from her vocational high school in the city of Avignon for wearing the headscarf when 
she had been wearing it for two years in middle school and two months at the high school without 
any issues (“"18 Septembre Au 22 Décembre 1989 : Un Automne En France Et Dans Le Monde." 
101) 
John Bowen argues that the domestic climate as well as “foreign threats [,] made scarf-
wearing into a national affair.” (83) He argues that there was an increasing disappointment with 
the Left in power the 1980s, represented by President Francois Mitterrand, that turned the political 
attention to Islam. On the other side, Bowen also argues that the attention on Islam as a “threat” 
came from a combination of international events that “brought together several related fears about 
Islam”: the famous fatwa put on the author Salman Rushdie by the Ayatollah Khomeini, bringing 
the fear that “[Islam] was intolerant; that Muslims, once in power, would kill those who left the 
religion […], that the relative success of the Iranian mullahs meant that Islam was on a worldwide 
roll […]” (83) Interestingly, he also highlights the fact that the Gabriel-Havez shared a few months 
before the case, a school class photo showing with a young girl wearing the veil “as evidence of 
the […]school’s openness to cultural diversity!” (83) 
Media and public intellectuals help bringing the “veil controversy” to public visibility 
nationwide. In fact, John Bowen writes that the veil wasn’t as mentioned in the media before 
1989: a browsing of the Le Monde’s mentions of the veil before that year show that the only 
mentions of Islamic garb referenced concern Muslim-majority countries, not France or French 
Muslims. Yet, as he also writes, during the week of the Créil affair, several newspapers and 
publications were publishing several features that were connecting the Islamic veil to global 
trends of Islamic fundamentalism, to the fatwa on Rushdie, or the Iranian “chadors”. Le Nouvel 
Observateur, for its October 5th issue, had titled its cover “Fanaticism: The Religious Menace”, 
along a picture depicting a “girl in a full, black chador” (Bowen 84) L’Express, a major 
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publication, titled its feature story on October 26th. “The Secular School in Danger: The Strategy 
of Fundamentalists.” Intellectuals write and share their opinions about the place of the Islamic 
veil and of religions in school; while some fear that laïcité might be threatened by the increasing 
visibility of religions, like journalist Guy Coq who asserts that “[the upholding of tolerance] 
would die if the different religious communities would compete to seize the laic space of the 
school […]” (Le Monde 2007) – others try not to oppose laïcité and integration, like write Leila 
Sebbar: “Laïcité yes, but not by any means. Three veils versus the integration of three million 
Muslims in France.” (Le Monde 2007)  
 In November 1989, two open letters written by intellectuals offer testimony of two 
strongly opposed positions: on one side, a letter to Jospin titled “Teachers, Let’s Not Give In!”, 
signed by Elisabeth Badinter, Régis Debray, Alain Finkielkraut and others, called out against 
“communautarist pressures”, argued that “by allowing de facto the Islamic veil, symbol of 
female submission, you are giving a blank check to […] the harshest patriarchy on the planet” 
and called the situation a “Munich of the Republican school (Badinter et al. 1989) On the other 
side, another letter titled “For an Open Laïcité” claimed that, although they “did not support 
scarves in schools,” they “opposed exclusion” and denounced a “Vichy of the integration of 
immigrants.” (Bowen 85)  
What is the reaction of the French public to these cases? Several polls, carried out by 
major newspapers, aim to take the a sample of the public opinion regarding the controversies. On 
October 30th, a poll realized for the newspaper Le Journal du dimanche shows that a majority of 
French students in public schools (the respondents where aged between 12 and 17 years old) 
deem that the headscarf should not be banned in schools, and that 72% of the surveyed teenagers 
replied that they do not find shocking to be affirming one’s religious affiliations through 
religious symbols for instance. As proselytism and public order within schools was often brought 
as an argument for the proponents of the prohibition of the veil in schools, these figures reveal 
that a large majority of those primarily concerned – the school students – do not feel bothered by 
headscarves or other visible religious symbols from their peers. ("18 Septembre Au 22 Décembre 
1989 : Un Automne En France Et Dans Le Monde." 104) 
A poll in Le Monde, whose results were published on November 30th, 1989, aims to show 
the differences of opinion between “French citizens” (non-Muslims) and residents (regardless of 
their nationality) who claim to belong to a Muslim family. As the formulation of the poll is 
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questionable – as Francoise Gaspard and Farhad Khosrokhavar argue in Le Foulard et la 
République; there is no such thing as the “French” on one side and the “Muslims” on the other, 
especially when so many “French” citizens are of Muslim confession or of Arabo-Berber origin 
– the results are still telling. 75% of the “French” claim to be hostile to the veil in public schools, 
17% indifferent, 6% unfavorable. On the other side, 45% of the “Muslims” claim to be opposed 
to the veil, 30% are favorable to its presence in public schools, and 22% are indifferent. (Gaspard 
and Khosrokhavar 27) 
The debates ended up reaching the political sphere as the topic is discussed words in a 
parliamentary session on November 3rd, 1989. Lionel Jospin stands criticized by his own 
political party, the Socialist Party and other left-leaning parliament members who criticize him 
because of his statements in October, in which Jospin stated that the school was designed “to 
welcome and not to exclude children” and leaned towards reintegrating girls in the classroom if 
dialogue with the school administration did not succeed. In November 1989, Jospin decides to 
ask for legal advice from the Conseil d’Etat, [State Council] a body that acts as an adviser on 
legal affairs for the executive branch of the government, but also as a supreme court for 
administrative justice affairs.  
In December 12th, 1989, the ministry of Education releases a directive to all school 
administrations and rector’s councils titled “Laïcité, wearing of religious symbols by pupils and 
the mandatory nature of classes,” based on the State Council ruling given a month before. The 
directive directly addresses the “controversies provoked by the wearing of a veil by some young 
girls of Islamic confession” and reports the opinion shared by the Conseil d’Etat, which affirms 
there cannot be a “general and absolute prohibition of the veil or any other religious symbol, but 
that the wearing can be prohibited in function of the principles that… and according to specific 
circumstances.” Further in the directive text, it affirms that “the wearing of religious signs by 
pupils isn’t in itself incompatible with laïcité, in the measure as it is relevant to the exercise of 
freedom of speech and manifestation of religious beliefs affirmed by the Constitution, the 
international conventions ratified by France and the fundamental principles acknowledged by the 
laws of the Republic.” (Education nationale, Jeunesse et Sports 1989) However, the same text 
affirms that this freedom should “not allow students to display signs of religious belonging that, 
by their nature, by the conditions in which they are being worn individually and collectively, or 
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by their ostentatious or claiming character, would constitute an act of pressure, provocation, 
proselytism or propaganda […]” (Education nationale, Jeunesse et Sports 1989) 
 As it can be read, there is no active opposition to the Islamic veil or to any other wearing 
of a religious symbol expressed in the directive, as long as the clothing doesn’t constitute an act 
of “pressure, provocation, proselytism or propaganda”. The Conseil d’Etat itself does not call for 
an absolute ban of any religious symbols – even if it is worth noting that the directive discusses 
the issue as coming from the several veil controversies addressed in the media. The question of 
the veil was more than a simple religious affair in the French social and political framework. It 
was also taken in a broader national questioning on integration of immigrant groups, coming 
from Muslim-majority countries and former French colonies (notably Morocco, Algeria, 
Tunisia). After the Créil case, the government created an institution known as the High Council 
on Integration on a governmental body charged with researching and giving policy advice on 
matters of integration of immigrants. Over the next years, as Bowen notes, other cases involving 
girls wearing a headscarf being refused admission in schools emerge. Some of them reached 
administrative courts and the State Council, which maintained its initial ruling on which students 
may be allowed to wear scarves as long as they do not disturb public order within the school 
grounds, do not engage in proselytism or other misconducts. “[…] Of forty-nine legal disputes 
over headscarves that reached the Council between 1992 and 1994, forty-one ended in favor of 
the schoolgirl. But on a number of occasions, the State Council backed the school […] in 
expelling a girl if it could be demonstrated that she was frequently absent from school, engaged 
in proselytism, or refused to remove the veil scarf for required sports or chemistry classes […]” 
(87) 
 When exploring the chronology of the headscarves controversy and understanding how 
all religious symbols were finally concerned by the 2004 law, it is important to also bring 
attention to other religious signs or symbols and the way they were portrayed in the media or by 
politicians. Were religious symbols other than the Muslim headscarf brought to such a mediatic 
forefront in 1989? Pierre Birnbaum, author of Destins juifs: De la révolution française à 
Carpentras, a book about Jewish history in France, mentions a 1991 case in which a Jewish 
student was excluded from a high school in the city of Nice for missing classes on Saturday 
morning because of his religious obligations during Shabbat. The decision was validated by an 
administrative court on the legal basis invoking the need for regular school attendance from all 
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students. Another TV report of the France 2 Journal of 8PM focuses on the kippah and the 
decision of the Voltaire high school in Paris to forbid all religious symbols after the 1989 Créil 
cases. The Voltaire high school welcomes a minority of Jewish students that wear the kippah 
regularly. Interviewed students (none of them Jewish or seemingly concerned by the school’s 
decision) declare agreeing with the school’s decision, based on the fact that the wearing of 
religious symbols could cause “clans” or rivalry between religious groups within the school, or 
that everybody should dress up “normally”. The narrator affirms that the “kippah has rarely been 
an issue in public schools,” while an executive member of the main umbrella organization of 
French Jewish organizations, the CRIF (Conseil Représentatif des Institutions Juives de France), 
interviewed, draws a distinction between the kippah and the veil that he doesn’t view to be on the 
same level: “[the kippah] never consisted of a sign of non-membership of the French community, 
or of exclusion to the laws of the Republic” (INA “LA KIPPA” 1994) There has not been as 
much media coverage on the kippah or other religious symbols as the headscarf, and when the 
attention was brought on the kippah, it was for reasons external to the symbol in itself (e.g. 
repeated absences) or to show the point of view of the Jewish community, who while opposing 
the prohibition of all religious signs in schools, did view the headscarf as an issue. 
 The 1989 Créil case is the foot-in-the-door case that brought the Islamic veil as a 
controversy within school grounds to the public forefront when a few years ago, it did not seem 
to pose a problem for school administrations or regular citizens. Its appearance as object viewed 
as problematic and controversial will mark French society from the decades to come. Gaspard 
and Khosrokhavar describe the three weeks that followed the first mention in the media of the 
Créil case as a “a punctual, local event, dealt with by basic journalists, [that] became a social 
question commented upon by the “grand names” of national press. The debate doesn’t die. 
Written press is invaded by articles on Islam and laïcité.” (17) Créil marks the beginning of a 
spotlight being brought to the Islamic veil as an object incompatible with Republican laïcité and 
French values. It marks the beginning of series of “veil controversies” that during the 90s 
decade, will agitate public opinion while the government remains without a general ruling on the 
matter, preferring to rule by “affaire d’espèce”, by the specifics of each case. Bowen also notes 
an interesting fact: “The day following Leila and Fatima’s readmission, December 3rd, 1989, the 
[Front National] scored its most spectacular victory to date, winning 61 percent of the 
parliamentary votes in the community of Dreux, west of Paris.” (86-87) Even if Bowen seems to 
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draw a possible causal link between a political victory of the FN and the foulard controversies, 
1989 still remains the date in which the veil made its appearance as a major threat in the 
Republican school’s courtyards, when it did not seem to be an issue beforehand for school 
administrations. 
2.2. 1990-2003: New headscarf controversies 
 The 90s decade follows with its share of controversial incidents opposing several Muslim 
girls and school administrations. Gaspard and Khosrokhavar write that the atmosphere in public 
schools, between the end of 1989 and fall 1994, was, “in most [cases], [an attitude] of dialogue 
and tolerance” (Gaspard and Khosrokhavar 188) arguing that the majority of cases were solved 
with dialogue between the families of the Muslim girls concerned.  
Similarly to the 1989 Créil cases, the increase in reported cases is handled by the media 
with pessimism, leading to a change in perception of the Islamic veil by the French public and 
thus a shift tending towards prohibition in the government’s response. In September, a TV report 
showed students at the Romain Rolland high school in Goussainville who created a group in 
support of 4 Muslim schoolgirls who were expulsed from wearing the veil. The group of students 
blocked the high school for an entire day, and the report shows the presence of police cars the 
day after the student demonstrations. A professor, interviewed, speaks of “terrorism” when 
talking about the interactions between the students protesting by blocking access to the school, 
and the rest of the students (INA October 1994) On October 3rd, the police was even called to 
prevent 22 Muslim girls wearing headscarves from entering the Faidherbe high school in the city 
of Lille, as they were accompanied by a hundred demonstrators supporting them. Furthermore, 
two major cases in 1990 occupied a great place in media coverage. The two cases, one from the 
city of Nantua, the other taking place in the city of Grenoble, involved Muslim schoolgirls, who 
were expulsed from their respective schools. The Grenoble schoolgirl, named Schérazade, had 
decided to keep her hijab on during P.E. class and was expulsed; she even decided to go on a 
hunger strike that lasted almost a month while living in car parked in front of the school, 
attracting worldwide press attention. (Bowen 88) The Nantua case included four Muslim girls 
who were allowed to wear their headscarf in class but when asked to remove it for P.E. class, 
refused and were subsequently expulsed from the school. Teachers complained against the 
headscarf, claiming that it “is discriminatory in its treatment of girls and segregationist.” (Bowen 
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87) and the two cases were quickly opposed to each other. The girl from Grenoble had converted 
to Islam by her own accord while facing initial resistance from her parents, while the Nantua 
girls had their parents and brothers speak for them in public, and even had “two self-proclaimed 
Islamic authorities [declaring] that Islam required women to cover themselves.” (87) In both 
cases, the girls’ expulsion was validated by the State Council in 1995 for the reason that both the 
hunger strike and the intervention of external actors – the attention of these “Islamic authorities” 
– were considered trouble to the public order of the school and thus valid reasons for expulsion.  
Furthermore, the media was intertwining coverage of headscarf affairs with that of the 
Islamist threat and violence happening in Algeria at the time. In fact, a Islamic fundamentalist 
movement, the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) created in 1989, had taken a much more 
radicalized path in response to political turmoil emerging in Algeria in 1991. The FIS created a 
militia, the Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA), responsible for several terrorist attacks in Alger and 
other Algerian cities, targeting French authorities and citizens. In May 1994, two French 
clergymen are assassinated in Alger; in August 1994, three French policemen as well as two 
French embassy officers are murdered in the same city. These events set up what is known as the 
Algerian Civil War (1991-2002) or what is called now the “second Algerian War” (90) The 
French government reacts vehemently to these attacks, as the Interior Minister Charles Pasqua 
launches a security crackdown on French banlieues, its “difficult neighborhoods” and arrests a 
number of French Muslims of Algerian origin following the August 1994 attacks (90) Bowen 
writes that “television programs in 1993-94 often linked the foreign to the domestic, placing 
coverage of “headscarf affairs” in the same time slot as coverage on ongoing fighting in Algeria 
(which at the moment was constantly on the news), rather than with other social issues. ‘For the 
average viewer, the conclusion is obvious: headscarf = Islam = terrorism,’ complained one 
young “believing but non-practicing” Muslim businesswoman.” (90) Newspapers and magazines 
were also drawing links between French Muslim schoolgirls and the Islamic threat: L’Express 
publishes a special issue on April 29th, 1993 titled “The Islamists”, focusing on Algeria, Egypt 
and France. On November 17th, 1994, the same magazine featured a cover with a woman in a 
black head covering and the title “Foulard, the Plot: How the Islamists Infiltrate Us.” (Bowen 90) 
Intellectuals that were against the authorization of headscarves in 1989 push further and affirm 
the idea that the headscarf is a manifestation of Islamic fundamentalism: André Glucksmann 
calls the headscarf a “terrorist emblem” (Bowen 90) At the same time, the public opinion on the 
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headscarf was increasingly against it. In 1994, 86% of the French public opposed authorizing the 
wearing of the headscarf in schools (Cue).  
On September 20th, 1994, the minister of Education at the time, Francois Bayrou, releases 
a new directive addressed to all public school administrations in an answer to an increasing 
demand of clear legislation and measures coming from professors. In this new directive, Bayrou 
requires all school administrations to ban all religious symbols on the basis that “their  meaning 
is precisely to take some pupils outside the rules for living together in the school.” (Bowen 89) 
He affirms that the Republic “excludes the breakdown into separated communities, indifferent to 
each other, only considering their own rules and their own laws” and explicitly opposes the 
wearing of “ostentatious” religious symbols in school, justifying that decision on the basis that 
“these signs are, in itself, elements of proselytization; even if the directive reiterates to professors 
that “our duty is before all, education.” (Education Nationale, Jeunesse et Sports 1994) 
Nevertheless, through this directive, the government decides to take a clear position against the 
wearing of any religious symbols in schools. It contrasts with the previous Jospin directive, 
which asserted the compatibility between laïcité and the headscarf – given that the headscarf was 
considered within the boundaries of freedom of expression – and which, following the 1989 
State Council decision, states that a general prohibition of the wearing of headscarves in schools 
was not conceivable. The government’s shift in policy is noticeable – coming from pressure from 
media, teacher unions, and public opinion. Teachers applaud the decision, as more than a 
hundred girls are expelled following the directive. The total number of girls expulsed based on 
the headscarf went from the “low hundreds to the two thousands” in the years following the 
directive (Bowen 89) Two expelled girls even recall how their teachers argued that they couldn’t 
have what happened in Algeria happening here (90) However, several of these cases were 
brought in front of courts, even up to the State Council, that would prove the Muslim schoolgirls 
right if they showed that the scarf was the sole reason for expulsion. In fact, despite the 
instructions of the directive, students could not be expelled from public schools for the simple 
reason of wearing a headscarf, and throughout 1996-1997, the State Council would side with the 
schoolgirls unless it could be proven that they had violated the rules of the school, missed classes 
repeatedly or had engaged in proselytism. (91-92) Over the few years, the number of “headscarf 
incidents” per year fell to 150. (92) 
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In the mid-1990s, on the legal realm, the jurisprudence of the State Council was 
prevailing on disputes opposing Muslim schoolgirls and school administrations. The “Islamic 
peril” was becoming a regularly cycling story across covers of major newspapers like L’Express, 
Le Point or le Nouvel Observateur. Also, new domestic terrorism concerns arise when a series of 
bombings between July and October 1995 is carried out by the GIA in Paris and the Lyon 
regions, the deadliest being set in Paris regional train network, killing 8 and hurting 200 
passengers. Anxiety reaches a new peak, as is made the “the amalgamation of mental categories 
of Islam and terrorism” (Silverstein 130) The theme of the suburbs, the “banlieues”, the 
“dangerous neighborhoods” surrounding major cities like Paris, Lyon or Marseille also became a 
recurrent topic in the news, as the topic of “ghettoization” started to worry the French public 
(Bowen 92) The 9/11 World Trade Center attacks also reinforced the fear of Islam, and the link 
to the headscarves was made by the media, just like in previous attacks. Bowen writes about the 
change in tone used by Hanifa Chérifi, the Education Ministry mediator in charge of headscarf 
affairs, who interviewed after a new headscarf affair in 2002, told that while “many claimed that 
the headscarf gave a girls a space of freedom between the family and the society, “we have 
neglected the intrinsic significance of the voile: to remind women, starting at puberty, that 
Islamic morality forbids mixing of the sexes in all public spaces, including the school.’” (93) 
Late in 2002, a new series of scarf affairs started to bring national and even international 
media attention. They began in Lyon, which also happened to be one of the locations for new 
Islamic movements, but also radical activists (93). In December, a teacher at the La Martinière 
high school, Jean-Claude Santana, complained to the school administration about a schoolgirl, 
Fatiha, who was wearing a headscarf. She had begun to wear a bandana in December, which was 
allowed, but then started unrolling it up so that it covered her hair. National television, and even 
the Wall Street Journal came to report on this case. As the school administration refused to 
suspend her, by fear of having the expulsion being overruled by the State Council, 80% of the 
teachers at the school decided to go on strike in March. They had beforehand issued a statement 
that said “[…] the student considers her scarf to be a sign of her belonging to a community and 
her religion, thus it is meant to attract attention (is ostentatoire), and our internal rules forbid 
that.” (Bowen 94) Fatiha had been wearing a bandana since the beginning of the school year in 
September, yet she attended all her classes and had not been noticed for any other kind of 
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behavior in class. Chérifi was asked to intervene, and after the superintendent of the school had 
met with the teachers, they decided to end their strike.  
This case brought to popular consciousness the possibility of the bandana as a form of 
head covering that would seem less “Islamic for the teachers and thus more acceptable but 
perhaps cover enough hair to satisfy some Muslim girls.” (96) But the case also showed that 
some teachers were willing to disturb the entire school for one girl in a headscarf, to protect a 
form of laïcité that they deemed proper in public schools, beyond the laïcité of the State Council. 
Santana said in an interview that they, the teachers, were defending “the Laïcité. Not the idea 
expressed by the State Council, laïcité with multiple standards. […] The school’s mission has a 
liberating ambition: to give citizens-in-the-making the means to free themselves from social, 
cultural, ethnic or gendered determinism.” (96) The main challenge to the rulings of the State 
Council was then placed: according to the schools, it was laïcité’s mission to protect students 
from external pressures, which required “active intervention by the state against pupils and 
families who try to exert such pressure.” (96-97) As Bowen put it, it was a time where “we are 
[…] far beyond the idea of the state’s neutrality […] The grounds had shifted; a confrontation 
seemed more likely.” (97) 
The 2000s also saw a more politically charged environment on the topic of the headscarf. 
The then Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy gave a speech at the Rencontre Annuelle des 
Musulmans de France, a yearly salon organized by the Union des organisations islamiques de 
France (UOIF), one of the major umbrella organizations of Muslim associations in France. This 
“inflammatory” speech, in which Sarkozy spoke of the need for Muslim women wearing the 
headscarf to remove it during identity pictures, and in which he criticized religious associations 
that “skirted the Republic’s laws by registering with the government as cultural associations 
(Meiers 9) 
A new headscarf affair emerged, grabbing immediately the attention of the media, in 
2003. Alma and Lila Lévy, two sisters enrolled in the Henri-Wallon high school in the city of 
Aubervilliers, a northeastern suburb of Paris, showed up in headscarves in September following 
up a personal conversion to Islam. Their parents didn’t approve of their conversion, which  “did 
scare people [who were looking] for the radicals wo must have put them up to it” (Bowen 111) 
As with earlier cases, school administration looked for compromise, by trying to convince the 
sisters to wear a “light foulard” versus a “foulard islamique”, to which the girls refused – which 
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led to their expulsion. As with previously highly publicized affairs, this incident led public 
figures to use the case as an occasion to sound their slogans. (111-112) The Mouvement contre le 
Racisme et pour l’Amitié entre les Peuples’s general secretary, Mouloud Aounit, used the 
expulsion to denounce “islamophobie” in France. (112) 
 
2.3. 2003-2004: The Stasi Commission and the establishment of the law 
On July 3rd, 2003, President Jacques Chirac announces the constitution of a commission, 
constituted by twenty members (sociologists, professors, politicians, school administrators…) led 
by Bernard Stasi to report on issues associated with laïcité, but mainly understood as focusing on 
headscarves. The initial goal of this commission did not seem to be a new law: the commission 
began working without knowing the outcome of its reports, and most commissioners did not 
favor a new law. (Bowen 113) Most commissioners started unsure of the necessity of the law, yet 
at the end of it, eighteen voted for a new law, with only one abstention. Why? 
The commission auditions 140 different people representing civil society – professors, 
teachers in public schools, clerics, on various topics concerning laïcité and the place of religion 
in France. In fact, the commission made a large number of recommendations on religious life in 
France, with only one of these recommendations being on clothing. Bowen writes that “many of 
the commissioners reported their frustration that only the scarf issue was taken seriously as an 
item for immediate legislation” (113), yet of course the debates were all focused on the 
headscarf, the place of Muslims in the Republic, “and more particularly of Muslims who showed 
themselves in public as distinct from other people. [...] The anger and the discussions and all the 
news articles and television programs were about whether and how Muslims could fit within 
France.” (113-114) He adds as well that as much as there was a large array of issues on which 
the commissioners wanted to focus, the topics brought up by the commission were only deemed 
relevant “only insofar as they involved the public actions of Muslims and the questions of 
headscarves.” (116) Unemployment in the suburbs and discrimination were topics brought before 
the commission, but it decided to stop at giving a general plea to stop the issues instead of 
digging further, as the topics were thrown into the mix “to cover the bases”, Bowen writes (116)  
The representation within the commission as well as within the 140 people heard was 
surprising. In fact, among the commissioners was no one “likely to present the views, 
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experiences and interests” of Muslim schoolgirls. Plus, while the Stasi commission listened to a 
wide range of people, the commission did react differently to different kinds of witnesses, 
listening attentively to professors and school principals, but providing suspicion to the few 
Muslim witnesses who supported the law: “At one point, Jean Baubérot [member of the 
commission] chided his colleagues for suspecting a priori everything stated by Fouad Alaloui, 
the secretary-general of the UOIF.” (117) Another strong and surprising lack was the lack of 
Muslim schoolgirls heard by the commission, when of course they were the ones mainly 
concerned by the results of the commission. Louisa Larabi Hendaz, author of Le voile humilié ou 
les auditions manquées de la commission Stasi [“The humiliated veil or the missed auditions of 
the Stasi Commission”], writes: “Among hundreds of people auditioned, only two women 
wearing the headscarf were heard by the commission in the last place. […] But even then, other 
veiled women were refused to audition, when they are the firstly concerned. The panel of experts 
gathered by the Stasi audition remains very disputable because it is not impartial.” (84) The 
commissioners would frame most social questions by centering the voile, visible especially when 
Jean-Louis Borloo, Urban Affairs Minister, and heard on the question of insufficient funding for 
social and economic problems in the suburbs, “began by selecting as major problems the equality 
of men and women, girls in headscarves, and attitudes towards those girls who do not wear the 
voile.” (117) Even more surprising for a governmental commission, Bowen writes that few 
believed that the teachers and principals surveyed by the commission were representative of 
teachers in France. The teachers asked to testify had usually encountered a girl in a headscarf and 
had stories to tell about problems with Muslim students. Yet, 91% of all teachers in France had 
never encountered a student in a headscarf at their current school. Yet, the teachers who testified 
tended to generalize their sense of crisis to other teachers and other schools. (121) 
Furthermore, the unwillingness and thus the impossibility of the commission to hear 
other viewpoints than those who placed the headscarf as a negative object led the commission to 
have an already-formed opinion on the headscarf. When giving back the commission’s report to 
the President of the Republic Jacques Chirac, Stasi announces on television that “a law will 
finally relieve “thousands” of Muslim women who refuse to wear the veil,” (Hendaz 85) and 
even adds that “even though there are several explanations to the veil, it is objectively a sign of 
women’s alienation. It is possible that young girls might wear it to mark their independence. 
They mainly wear it because their parents, their brothers, religious organizations, force them to 
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do so. If they don’t, they are insulted.” (85-86) Hendaz denounces a simplistic and condensed 
understanding of girls wearing headscarves, when commissioners stated that “a majority of 
Muslim women doesn’t wear [the veil] and doesn’t want to wear it. Where do they get these so-
called percentages when they affirmed that they are unable to count how many girls wear it in 
schools?” (86) Ultimately, the commission gives back its report on December 11th, 2003. On the 
topic of headscarves in schools, it recommended that in all public schools, “appearances and 
signs displaying a religious or political affiliation be forbidden. […] The forbidden appearance 
and signs are signes ostensibles, such as large crosses, voiles, or kippahs. Discreet signs such as 
medallions, small crosses, Stars of David, hands of Fatima, or small Qur’ans are not regarded as 
signs displaying a religious affiliation.” (Bowen 123-124).  
Politicians ranked then behind the necessity of a new law, both from the Left and from 
the Right, even if some doubted its advisability. A member of the national Socialist leadership 
(the second main party of France at the time) reported that at the meeting preceding a declaration 
in support of the new law, “everyone rallied to it but considered it stupid” and that many who 
would later speak passionately for it were reluctant converts. (124) 
Nationally, public opinion was strongly supporting the new law. A poll conducted on 
December 3rd, 2003 found that 72 percent of those interviewed favored a ban on all “visible signs 
of religious or political affiliation in public schools” (124), which represented a strong shift from 
the 49 percent who were supporting the law in April. However, the increase is not surprising. On 
the extensive mediatic coverage of headscarves, Bowen affirms that each French citizen, 
between September 2003 and February 2004, would have read an average of two articles each 
day on the voile in each of the three major news dailies, “including stories about a series of 
Islam-related threats to the Republic: covered women at swimming pools […], patients refusing 
to be treated by male doctors, jurors wearing scarves while in court. and Muslims approving the 
stoning of adulterous women and booing the interior minister.” (125) 
Once the President Chirac delivered his December speech proposing a new law against 
religious signs in schools, it became clear that France’s legislative bodies would vote for the law 
in some form. (128) Demonstrations opposing the law project followed in December, January 
and February, yet the law got successfully voted on February 10th, 2004 by the General 
Assembly in a large majority (494 votes in support of the law, 36 against it), followed by a 
similar vote of the Senate and leading to the 2004 law officially dated from March 15th, 2004. 
Dos Santos Quaresma 27 
 
 
A chronological observation of the social and political context that led to the 2004 law 
allows to observe that the law was created as a socio-political reaction to the phenomenon of the 
headscarf in schools. Being the “issue” to which this law wanted to answer, the headscarf was the 
object of mediatic exposure, political obsession and public scrutiny – even if all religious symbols 
and signs ended up being prohibited, it was indeed the headscarf that was pointed out as the main 
“problem.” But why did it start being a problem in the first place? Why wasn’t it an issue before 
the Créil case of 1989? As seen in the first chapter, before Créil, most public schools tolerated the 
headscarf, and even saw it as a sign of coexistence – as the Gabriel-Havez school was proudly 
affirming before 1989. 
An answer to that question can be found in Cécile Laborde’s analysis of the 2004 law in 
Critical Republicanism: pointing out the absence of rules against the wearing of religious signs by 
pupils in schools, she argues that the “problem” with Muslim headscarves was “not merely that 
they were a religious symbol, but that they were a particularly visible one.” (63) Indeed, until 2004, 
it was up to the school administrations to decide whether or not a headscarf worn by a student was 
considered “ostentatious” or not. Laborde follows up by stating that “it is obvious that the criterion 
of ‘ostentation’ was designed specifically to target Muslim signs, and that it relied on a highly 
contestable notion of unacceptable visibility in the public sphere.” (63)  
The creation of the headscarf as a “threat” or a “problem” cannot be pinned to a single 
actor but indeed finds a blame in the actions and opinions of many: interpretations from professors, 
considerable mediatic coverage on headscarf “affairs”, bias and impartiality from politicians, along 
with the shadow of Islamic fundamentalists within and outside French national borders. This mix 
of factors gave birth to the 2004 law as France knows it for more than a decade now, a law that 
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III – ANALYZING THE APPLICATION AND THE IMPACTS OF THE LAW 
As seen in the previous chapter, the 2004 law stems from the extensive media and political 
attention suddenly brought on the Islamic headscarf in the beginning of the 1990s, as well as from 
the necessity felt by the government to appease the opponents and critics of the veil and to control 
what was increasingly perceived as a threat to the ideal of the Republican school. Even if the 
legislative text does not make specific mention of the veil or any other religious symbol, and aims 
to forbid all religious symbols and pieces of clothing altogether, it was written with in mind the 
issue of the Islamic headscarf. As such, I hypothesize that due to the amplified attention given to 
the veil by legislators and media, that the application of the law is also exaggeratedly affecting 
young Muslim girls wearing the veil in schools. Furthermore, I argue also that the law, as well as 
the debates that preceded it, also brought inflated concern on the Islamic headscarf and its place, 
not just in schools, but in the French public space in its entirety. 
In my initial model (Model 1), I defined the 2004 law as a variable that I named “Law 
(Universal Language with Differential Impact)”. In this chapter, I will look at data and present 
literature and data showing the ways in which the 2004 law’s universal language affected the 
French Muslim population, by focusing on the aftermath of the law. Muslims in France represent 
7,5% of the total population within its national borders, according to a Pew Research Survey 
realized in 2010. 
I am looking at several reports from both the government and from the Collectif contre 
l’Islamophobie en France, a non-governmental organization in France that observes and reports 
on the number of islamophobic incidents, and offers judicial assistance to the victims of 
islamophobic crimes. The organizations’ objectivity as well as its methods of reporting have been 
discussed as they base their releases on cases that are directly reported to them, unlike the 
Observatoire national de l’islamophobie that bases their figures on complaints brought before 
French police. Nonetheless, they remain an important source of statistics concerning the state of 
islamophobia in the country, and have gained legitimacy and a consultative status alongside the 
United Nations – while, interestingly, the Ministry of the Interior does not consider the CCIF as a 
partner and prefers to work solely with the Observatoire. The CCIF remains criticized by its 
detractors that reproach it to focus excessively on aggressions against veiled women – according 
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to a CCIF report from 2011, the profile of the veiled Muslim woman in a public space or service 
constitutes the typical profile of the victim of islamophobic incidents (Meziti 92)  
An official report on the assessment of the law accounts for 639 religious signs reported 
during the academic school year 2004-2005. Among these 639 signs, “two large crosses, eleven 
Sikh turbans, and the other signs all Islamic headscarves” (Chérifi 34) On these cases, 533 young 
Muslim girls decided to remove their headscarf, 67 decided to go to school abroad, 47 were 
expelled from the school, 26 decided to take classes from home, 12 were allowed to go to class as 
long as they were wearing a “discreet veil” The table also mentioned 3 young Sikh young boys 
getting expelled as well. (“Laïcité et port de signes religieux à l’école 2012) 
 More than the simple prohibition of headscarves and other religious pieces of clothing or 
signs in school, other incidents involving the veil reveal an increase in a negative depiction of the 
veil, as well as a broader application of the laïcité principle in other public spaces. In article issued 
in December 2005 in Le Point, the first line writes: “The law of March 2004 on religious signs in 
school sometimes has unexpected consequences. Applicable in school grounds, it sometimes spills 
over.” (Le Point Apr. 2017) It then tells the story of several veiled Muslim women who were 
refused service in public services (city halls, voting booths) because of their headscarf. One 
received a letter from the prefect of the region of Seine-Saint-Denis, when she went to pick up her 
residence permit, saying that her veil was a “sign of affiliation to a fundamentalist form of Islam” 
and that as result she did not prove her “republican integration in the French society, in accordance 
to the current regulation.” (Le Point Apr. 2017) Other cases describe a veiled woman who wasn’t 
allowed to be the witness at a wedding that took place in a city hall, and three women who weren’t 
allowed to vote in a polling booth because of their headscarves. These situations, along with many 
others, witness the scale in which the 2004 law affected women wearing headscarves, and not just 
Muslim schoolgirls who were supposed to be protected from familial pressure or students from 
proselytism – the 2004 law apparently enabled a form of discrimination to be enforced against 
women wearing headscarves in places where the law was not applicable.  
My model contains a variable based on what I named “Discrimination Sentiment” – 
basically how discriminated against, marginalized, alienated French Muslims feel or perceive 
themselves to be in French society. As I hypothesize that the 2004 law affected French Muslims 
disproportionately by bringing negative attention on the Islamic headscarf and brought negative 
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perceptions of Islam to the French social stage, I deem essential to dedicate a section of my analysis 
to perceptions of Muslims of their own place in French society. In order to grasp this factor, I 
based myself  on Pamela Irving Jackson and Peter Doerschler’s analysis of 2002, 2004, 2006 and 
2008 data coming from the European Social Survey reported in their book Benchmarking Muslim 
Well-Being in Europe, as well as the interviews made with the Muslim respondents in part 4.2.  
 Looking at their results on Muslim’s experiences of discrimination compared to non-
Muslims in France, there a few figures that are worth pointing out. First, the percentage of Muslims 
identifying with discriminated groups. Jackson and Doerschler separated discriminated groups into 
different types: race, religion, nationality, ethnicity. For instance, over 2002 and 2008, 15.8% of 
Muslims replied belonging to a discriminated group because of their religion, and 24.4% because 
of their race. (Jackson and Doerschler 110) It is quite surprising that most Muslims feel belonging 
to a discriminated group based on their race than other their religion, but it also highlights the 
racial component of discrimination against Muslims, born also from the existing xenophobia and 
anti-immigrant sentiment existing in France. Discrimination against Muslims is multi-
dimensional; as a report on multiple discrimination from the the European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights (the FRA) points out, Muslims are particularly vulnerable to discrimination 
triggered by more than one aspect of their identity. (Jackson and Doerschler 112-113) A 
Eurobarometer survey also reveals an interesting figure is first the progression in the percentage 
of Muslims claiming membership in a discriminated group. A table shows that while 30.8% of 
Muslims claimed membership in a discriminated group in 2002, this number increased in 2008, 
reaching 42.4%. (Jackson and Doerschler 111) 
4.2. Analysis of qualitative interviews 
4.2.1. Introduction and Methodology 
In order to understand the ways through the 2004 law has been playing a role in 
disproportionately marginalizing Muslims according to my hypothesis, I deem it is crucial to 
“measure the temperature” concerning state-religions relations in France by getting a sample of 
opinions on the 2004 law, laïcité, islamophobia, the state of religion in France before and nowadays. 
I hypothesize the establishing of the law, as well as the media attention brought on the Islamic veil 
specifically (rather than on other religious symbols also targeted by the law) have had an impact 
on the ways French citizens – regardless of their religion – view the State and its position on 
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religious affairs today, Islam in France, laïcité, the 2004 law. As such, I have been carrying out 
qualitative, informal interviews to question French citizens of all ages, religions and convictions 
on the aforementioned topics. I have interviewed a total number of 11 participants, both in person 
and via Skype. 
Before proceeding to the analysis of the subjects, it is essential I acknowledge the fact that 
limited resources and time for this thesis have affected my capability at effectively obtaining a 
representative sample of French citizens and their views. These qualitative interviews don’t have 
the objective of being a representative sample of the French population. However, they have 
brought to my project several questions and angles of view that I aim to address in this paper, and 
maybe raise questions that I hope to answer in the future.  
The questions the respondents were asked were organized in three parts. The first is 
composed of introductory questions of demographic order – concerning the respondents’ age, 
gender, professional occupation, nationality, personal religious background as well as parents’ 
religious background. Through the second part of the interview, respondents were asked about 
their perception of religion and its place in the French society: according to them, what is the place 
France allows to religion in public spaces? How is religion approached and discussed in the French 
society? Has the place of religion in the French public debate changed over the years? If so, how 
and when? Finally, the last set of questions would vary depending on the religious background of 
the respondent. If the respondent would define themselves as Muslim, they would be asked on 
their experience on being Muslim in France. Have they ever felt discriminated against because of 
their religion? If yes, they would be asked to talk further on their discrimination experiences, and 
whether they have experienced similar discrimination throughout the years. The goal of these 
questions to Muslim respondents would be to understand their perception of islamophobia in 
France, whether or not they have felt affected, and especially if this has changed over the years, 
evolved with events or time. If the respondents defined themselves as other than Muslim, they 
would be asked about their opinion on specific religious expression in public spaces (the street, 
public schools, hospitals, town halls, workplaces). Non-Muslim respondents would also be shown 
pictures of people wearing various religious symbols or clothing, and asked if each person 
portrayed on the pictures should be allowed into a different public space. Ultimately, both groups 
of respondents would be asked about the 2004 law, if they knew it, and was their opinion on it.  
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Religion of the respondent Age scale of the respondent Gender of the respondent 
1) Agnostic 18-24 Male 
2) Catholic 25-34 Male 
3) Muslim 18-24 Female 
4) Muslim 18-24 Male 
5) Muslim 25-34 Female 
6) Muslim 25-34 Female 
7) Jewish 18-25 Female 
8) Muslim 18-25 Male 
9) Deist 18-25 Male 
10) Without religion 18-25 Male 
11) Atheist 25-34 Female 
 
4.2.2. Analysis of the respondents answers to the interviews  
My evaluation grid is based on my interview questions (cf. appendix). The first major 
question concerned the perception of the debates and the discourse surrounding religion in France. 
All respondents talked about the strong place religion took in the current French debate, that 
respondents mostly qualified as being “very important”, “very present”, “negative”, “too focused 
on Islam”. One non-Muslim respondent argued that when one brings up the topic of religion in 
France, “we immediately think about Islam”, while another respondent, Muslim, brings up the 
“historical discomfort [malaise] France has with religion”; another non-Muslim respondent argued 
that “yes, when he hear about religion in the news, it’s often to discuss of Islam or terrorism or 
both.”  
When it comes to the question whether or not there has been a change in the discourse 
surrounding religion in France, and when respondents are asked to give a “before-and-after” key 
date, age is an interesting factor that plays into the perceptions of the debates in France. As I 
interviewed mostly young people (18-25 years old), a majority of the respondents said that before 
2010 or before the January and November 2015, they did not feel like Islam or French Muslims 
were a topic as heated as before. On the other side, the older respondents gave much older dates. 
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One respondent gave the key date as the 9/11 attacks as the event that marked a “before-and-after” 
in the ways French Muslims and Islam was spoken of in the media or perceived in the public 
consciousness. Another one, aged 23, gave the 1980s as a key date, talking about the waves of 
immigration coming from Maghreb countries as a trigger for more discussion on Islam and 
Muslims in France and arguing that the 1980s represented the first time the headscarf made an 
appearance on mainland France. This difference in key dates is surely associated with age, and the 
fact that the younger respondents probably were too young to interest themselves to media 
discourse. One respondent offered 2004 and 2010 as the key date, quoting respectively the 2004 
law and the 2010 “burqa ban” as moments in which attention focused more on French Muslims 
and Islam.  
Concerning the 2004 law, there were significant differences in opinion between Muslim 
and non-Muslim respondents. A majority of Muslim respondents said they saw the 2004 law as 
“unjust”, “unfair” and called out on the “hypocrisy” of the law. One Muslim respondent argued 
that the law “was mediatic and legal energy that ended up being spoiled, because the public school 
needs many other reforms,” and said that the arguments brought up against the headscarf in school 
were not valid in her opinion (“ I don’t see how my headscarf pressures someone else. How is it 
ostentatious?”) On the other hand, a Muslim respondent argued  however that if she could, she 
wouldn’t cancel the 2004 law because it was “already in public consciousness” and because “it’s 
not aiming at anyone specifically” even though she felt the law was targeting differences and the 
right of young Muslim girls to live the way they wanted. The Jewish respondent mentioned that 
the “2004 law was not necessary unjust,” but that by prohibiting a certain expression, it was going 
against her concept of laïcité as a laïcité that “allowed” instead of “prohibiting”. One non-Muslim, 
deistic respondent argued that the 2004 law, although he was not against it, felt it was badly 
“applied”. He retold a time in December 2016 when he was wearing in class a sticker with the 
name of “Coexister”, a French youth general interest association that advocates interreligious 
social cohesion – in which the “x” is a star of David, and the “t” a Christian cross. His professor 
asked him to remove it, on the pretext that these composed visible, ostentatious religious signs, 
and he disagreed with her, even if he ended up removing it. Another respondent, agnostic, 
answered that he was neutral to the law, as it stigmatized all religious signs and symbols. He called 
it “a républicanist law that aimed to integrate and assimilate”; yet thought it was not a necessary 
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law. Another non-Muslim respondent also argued that he would abrogate the law if he could 
because there was a gap between “its wording” and “its application”. 
On the topic of laïcité, many respondents argued that it was in fact an important pillar of 
the Republic, but all agreed to say it was badly applied or “instrumentalized” against Islam. 
Interestingly, even if most respondents claimed that laïcité was “badly applied” or “manipulée” 
[manipulated], when asked the following question “If you could, would you change or repeal the 
2004 law prohibiting the wearing of religious symbols or clothing in public schools?”, most of the 
respondents also responded that they would not. They have given different reasons. One 
respondent argued that they would not abrogate the law because the law only applied to school 
pupils, “minors who are not always fully conscious of their religious choices”. Three  respondents 
argued that they wouldn’t repeal nor change it as the law “had already been accepted” by the 
majority of the French public. Other respondents also argued that they would not change or repeal 
it because the law was not specifically targeting Muslims in its redaction, nonetheless agreeing 
that a lot of the media attention was brought specifically on the Islamic veil. 
On the topic of discrimination encountered by Muslims, the female respondents in my 
survey talked about their experiences with discrimination, while the few Muslim men I interviewed 
did encounter more ignorance than discrimination from their peers. Among the Muslim women I 
interviewed, those who wear the headscarf pointed out that most discrimination they found would 
be based on their headscarf (insults, people telling them to remove it in the streets or in other public 
spaces) One respondent, a 30-year old French Muslim woman seeking employment, mentioned an 
incident in which the Islamic headscarf was refused in a public space other than a public school, 
in name of “the laïcité of the space” [“espace laïque”]. She mentions a job interview in which the 
hiring manager required her to remove the headscarf if she wanted to get the job, affirming that 
“their company was a laic space” and that her headscarf was not conforming to the norms of a 
“laic company”. Another Muslim female respondent, who also wears the veil, talked about her 
experience of being annoyed by a man in a subway who told her that “her headscarf didn’t belong 
in a laic country”. She also mentioned, being an anthropology student, a time in 2014 where she 
was told her headscarf was “breaking the law” by one of the students after a class on islamophobia. 
All women wearing the scarf I have talked with discussed about their fears of not finding a job in 
France. A respondent mentioned how the “job market is inaccessible to people who “wear their 
religion”” Another said she had been employed by a company who would hire only women 
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wearing the veil as call center employees. Two days after the July 26th, 2016 murder of a priest in 
a church in St-Etienne-du-Rouvray, in Northern France, by two men who claimed to be acting for 
the so-called Islamic State, the manager of the company made a remark to the veiled employees 
about “how they should be happy to be there”.  
When I asked the oldest of the Muslim veiled women I interviewed if she noticed a 
difference in her daily life and personal experiences before and after the law, she said that she 
didn’t as she did not wear the headscarf until university. Yet, she told me the story of a classmate 
in high school, called S., who wore the veil and who in 2003, was asked by a professor if she would 
be able to “adapt herself to the new laws and to the other students” during a conversation about 
laïcité and remove her headscarf. The other pupils replied when the professor mentioned that S.’s 
headscarf was proselytism, saying that they “didn’t have an issue with S.’s headscarf and had their 
own critical mind.” The respondent also mentions that in her school complex of 2000 students, 
less than 10 pupils were wearing the headscarf.  
The Muslim men I interviewed said they haven’t faced discrimination in the job market or 
haven’t been harassed in public spaces like the subway or the streets. One of the respondents 
argued that it could be because his face “makes him look like he isn’t from Maghreb [tête non 
maghrébine]”, as he is French of Turkish origin. However, he mentioned a few times at university 
where students asked him questions on Islam: for instance, a student in October 2016 told him she 
thought “in Islam, women were treated like animals”, and another student asking him “if he knew 
about radical Muslims who pretend to be integrated in Western societies” Respondents of other 
religions (Catholicism, Judaism) mentioned that they didn’t feel like they had been discriminated 
against or been harassed because of their religion.                                                                                                             
4.2.3. Conclusions on the qualitative interviews 
Because of the small number of interviewees, I do not aim to give conclusions that can be 
applicable to the categories of age, gender or religion they belong to. In fact, through my interviews, 
I noticed that most, if not all, interviewees had a very similar idea of what laïcité should be, and 
that it was not being applied correctly in conformity to the “1905 spirit”, and some even argued 
that it was being instrumentalized against Islam. As a fact, I recognize there is great improvement 
to be made in terms of number and the composition diversity of my interview sample. However, 
there are  nonetheless interesting points to be taken from these interviews. 
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 Most Muslim respondents do disagree with the 2004 law that they deem unfair, as they see 
it as fitting in a larger scope of a “badly applied” laïcité, or a laïcité “that betrays the spirit of the 
law of 1905”, as well as fitting in a mediatic and political climate that they see as hostile against 
Muslims. The non-Muslim respondents I have interviewed all have a similar concept of what 
laïcité should be versus what is now, and mostly talk about a current “bad interpretation of laïcité” 
that is brought by certain quoted politicians. Three respondents mentioned Manuel Valls, former 
Prime Minister, who declared to be in favor of a prohibition of the hijab in universities, as an 
example of “bad interpretation” of laïcité. Two other respondents mentioned Marine Le Pen, leader 
of the far-right party Front National. 
 These interviews did help confirm the link between an “application” of the law deemed 
unfair and a feeling of being discriminated against. In fact, confronted to new forms of laïcité (“laic 
company”, people arguing whether or not the streets or the subway are public spaces where 
headscarves shouldn’t be used, etc.) that found themselves emboldened, the Muslim respondents 
on my survey felt discriminated against, just like the cases I quoted in part III mentioned by Le 
Point, where the concept of laïcité is used as an obstacle “anti-headscarf” and used as a 
discriminatory argument against women wearing the headscarf. 
4.3. Analyzing the results of the online survey 
4.3.1. Introduction and Methodology 
I have carried out an online survey composed in total of 20 questions, and collected in total 
59 responses, all from French speakers and living in France. They were all introduced with similar 
questions on their religious beliefs, as well as their parents’, followed by question on whether or 
not they possessed the French nationality. Secondly, the survey contained questions with the goal 
of answering three main questions that I deem relevant to this analysis and that will form the 
structure of my evaluation grid. 
 First, what understanding do French citizens have of the 2004 law? As of now, the law has 
been in application for more than ten years. Given the controversy it gave birth to before and after 
its official proclamation, it would be possible to assume that many would know, even vaguely, 
what the law consists of. The wording of the law, as well as exposure to it through diverse media 
might be factors that affect the understanding of the law. However, my goal is to observe if there 
are variations in what the law allows and what respondents grasp of it. I wrote two stories, in which 
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a public school teacher visibly discriminates against Muslim students. In the first one, a Muslim 
female student wearing the headscarf is told by her professor telling her to remove it, while another 
Christian student is wearing a large cross pendant and isn’t told to remove it. In the second story, 
a Christian student receives an excuse for not attending class on the day of Easter, when a Muslim 
student is not excused by his professors for missing class on the day of Aid-al-Adha. I then asked 
the respondents which situations they found unfair or unjust, and why. As such, understanding 
what is the element they considered unjust in one or both or neither of the stories would be a hint 
of their understanding of the law. I also aim to measure citizen’s understanding of the 2004 law 
later in my qualitative interviews in the following sub-chapter.  
Second, what do ordinary French citizens consider to be ostentatious or conspicuous? The 
2004 law explicitly reads that what is forbidden is the “wearing of symbols or clothing by which 
students conspicuously indicate their religious belief is forbidden” (Legifrance 2004) the The 
survey contained four questions trying to understand what do people consider ostentatious, and 
asking them why. Two questions showed a set of 16 pictures, including religious symbols (crucifix 
pendant) and clothing (a man wearing a Sikh turban, a woman wearing a Muslim hijab, another 
woman wearing a Muslim niqab, covering the whole body except the eyes), everyday non-religious 
clothing (a picture of a man wearing a shirt and jeans, a woman standing on a beach wearing a 
bikini), clothing associated with a specific religion but not technically religious (a woman running 
on a beach wearing a burkini), non-religious clothing that is ostentatious outside of an everyday 
setting (a woman wearing a bright white wig with bright makeup, a man wearing a kilt in a street), 
and ambiguous clothing (a picture of a woman wearing a scarf covering her hair and the back of 
her head in a similar fashion to a hijab, a man wearing a t-shirt marked with the word “COEXIST” 
made of various religious symbols). I then asked the subjects of the survey to select any picture 
they considered to be conspicuous, then to justify their choice with some simple sentences. After 
that, I asked the subjects to select (from the same initial group of pictures) which ones represented 
people they think were wearing clothing or symbols that should be forbidden in public spaces, and 
to justify their choices as well. These questions would allow me to have a small grasp of the 
possible bias – or lack thereof –  of French citizens concerning what is ostentatious in their opinion, 
and hear from them what constitutes conspicuity in public spaces.  
Third, what is laïcité according to them? What is their vision of laïcité, and what place 
should be accorded to it? The third part of the survey consisted of 10 statements by various French 
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politicians commenting on several cases related to religion and the public sphere, talking about 
their vision of laïcité, or talking about their position on the Islamic headscarf. I asked the 
participants whether they “strongly disagreed”, “disagreed”, were “neutral”, “agreed” or “strongly 
agreed” with the statements proposed. The quotes were not referenced, allowing for impartiality. 
I wanted to compare with their answers to the picture-related questions, and also observe if there 
is a specific version of laïcité that aligns with finding certain religious symbol or clothing 
ostentatious or not. 
4.3.2. Demographic data of the respondents  
First, I will describe the demographic data I have collected on the respondents of the online 
survey, concerning their gender, age, religion/beliefs and nationality. 
An overwhelming majority (76.27%, 45 respondents) of the respondents are male, with 
23.73% (14) of female respondents. Age-wise, 32.20% (19) respondents were aged 18-24 years 
old, with also 19 respondents aged between 30-44 years old. 20.34% (12) respondents were aged 
between 45-65 years old, and only 9 (15.52%) respondents were aged between 25-29 years.  
Concerning religion, a majority (35.59%, 21 respondents) of the respondents define 
themselves as Christian, while 25.42% (15) of the respondents defining themselves as atheists, and 
16.95% (10) selecting the “Without any religion or belief”. There can be a parallel to be drawn 
with recent French religious demographics that also put Christianism as the major religion of the 
country, followed by absence of religion and atheism. Only 2 respondents defined themselves as 
Muslim (3.39%), while only 1 (1.69%) respondent defined himself as Jewish. 
Regarding nationality, the overwhelming majority of the respondents are French-born 
(93.22%, 55 respondents), with only 2 respondents of foreign nationality. and 2 respondents that 
obtained the French nationality through the naturalization process. 
4.3.3 Analyzing answers to the “situations” question 
Respondents were asked to answer the following question: 
“Situation 1: In a French public school at 8am, a mathematics class begins. A Muslim girl wearing a hijab and a 
Christian girl wearing a necklace with a large wooden cross pendant sit side by side. The teacher asks the Muslim 
girl to take her veil out of the classroom, telling her that the law requires it, and says nothing to the Christian girl 
wearing a wooden cross necklace around her neck. 
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Situation 2: In a French public school, on 7 January, a pupil of the Orthodox Christian faith excused his absence 
the previous day because of the feast of the Epiphany on 6 January. His apology is accepted by his teachers. On 
September 13, in the same school, a student of Muslim faith excused his absence the day before because of the 
feast of Aid-al-Adha. His apology is not accepted by his teachers, and it will be marked on his bulletin. 
 
Question: With regard to the two situations presented above: do you consider them just or unjust? If so, one 
more than the other? Why? Which? If not, why? Thank you for your reply and comment below. Short sentences 
are sufficient.” 
 
Eliminating unreadable answers, I collected 55 responses in total for this question. A large 
majority of respondents (55 respondents) have answered that both situations were unjust. Most 
respondents who affirmed that both situations were unjust argued that there should be no inequality 
of treatment between the two students in each situation. In fact, two (2) respondents argued that 
“public schools are mostly “laic” and unjust treatment should not occur. One respondent affirmed 
that “laïcité does not make a hierarchy out of religions”, another respondent wrote that “These two 
situations are unjust because there isn’t the same tolerance towards religions. […] In a laic country, 
the law must be equal for all.” It seems that most respondents understand that the 2004 law is 
prohibiting against all religious symbols. Some respondents raised important questions concerning 
what makes a symbol “ostentatious”, “visible” or not: a respondent wrote that a large cross could 
be considered not “ostentatious” if it can be dissimulated behind a shirt, while on the other hand, 
another respondent called the cross to be an “ostentatious sign” of Christian faith, if the headscarf 
was also considered to be one. Two respondents wrote their disagreement towards the conditions 
of the law: one explained that “every student should have the right to practice their religion without 
risking being punished, as long as their practice doesn’t infringe on the other students’ rights,” 
while another wrote that he would advocate for authorizing a hijab or a cross in “public laic spaces 
[…] as long as it wouldn’t prevent from identifying a person.” One respondent argued that “In 
both cases, the teachers are hierarchizing religions and are accepting from Christianity what they 
don’t accept from Islam,” while another expressed himself on islamophobia in schools: “The 
situations are unjust because they show a difference of consideration between religions showing 
discrimination against Islam. […] The first situation is more probable in real life than the second.”  
Four (4) respondents answered that the situations were unjust, but argued at the same time 
other points. One respondent argued that the “second situation was even more unjust that the first, 
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because […] the cross can be easily hidden under clothes unlike a hijab.” Another wrote a similar 
argument: “The first situation seems unjust to me, if the cross is really “large” and entirely visible. 
However, if the student can hide it or justify a more sentimental value of the necklace, that could 
be excusable.”  
Two (2) respondents argued that the first situation was fair but not the second. One 
respondent wrote that a “cross pendant or a David star necklace are discreet, and they don’t 
impeach a person to be. A hijab does. If the Christian girl had worn an unspecified headwear, they 
would have asked to remove it anyways. The first situation is fair, according to me.” Another 
respondent affirmed that the “S1 was fair, one must remove their headwear in class,” leaving a 
doubt on whether his argument was on a religious basis or a courtesy basis (“all people should 
remove their headwear, whether it is religious or not”) One respondent commented that he felt that 
the first situation was unfairer than the the second because he lived in a region where the Concordat 
was still in place (Alsace-Moselle) thus making all Christian holidays public holidays. 
On the other hand, two respondents did not consider the situations presented in the question 
to be unfair at all. One replied that “France is a Christian country […] One must adapt to the way 
of the country in which they live. If someone goes to a school in North Africa and skip class 
because of a Christian celebration, will the excuse be accepted? Will that person be allowed to 
wear a cross in class?” while the other respondent wrote “I think both situations are just. France 
has a history marked by Catholicism, which is part of our culture, unlike Islam. Some behaviors 
in relation to Catholicism can be tolerated,” an argument that replaces France as a Catholic country 
and allows certain “behaviors” if they are considered “Catholic” but not if they belong to another 
religion. It is quite interesting to observe that the respondent who wrote that “France is a Christian 
country” answered he identified as an atheistic in the previous survey question.  
As such, we can observe that a strong majority of the respondents regarded the two 
situations presented as unjust, claiming that there should be no preferential treatment for a religion, 
and that both students should be treated equally in public schools, since, quoting a respondent, 
“public schools are laic.” Most respondents then understand the principles behind laïcité and the 
basis of equality invoked by the language used in the 2004 law: that all religions, all symbols, 
accessories or pieces of clothing are concerned by the prohibition. A minority of respondents 
argued that the first one was fair, due to the fact that an hijab is more visible, more ostentatious 
then, than a cross necklace regardless of size or that students shouldn’t wear clothing covering 
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their head in the classroom. An even smaller portion of the respondents answered that both 
situations were just, justifying discrimination against the Muslim students by stating France was a 
Catholic country or a country of Catholic tradition that should be more accepting of Christian 
religious expressions than it is of Muslim – explicitly expressing an opinion against the principles 
of the 1905 law.  
4.3.4 Analyzing answers to the “what is ostentatious?/what would you forbid?” question 
The second part of the overall survey (excluding demographic questions) focuses on the 
second question I aim to understand – what do French citizens consider ostentatious or not? The 
respondents were shown a panel of 15 pictures. In the first question of this section, they had to 
select all the images they considered ostentatious, and justify their choices. (The images used for 
this section can be found in the appendix at the end, which contains the numbers of the images I 
will use to make reference to.) 53 respondents in total answered this question. 
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Image # Number of times selected 
Image A 35 
Image B 12 
Image C 1 
Image D 8 
Image E 9 
Image F 8 
Image G 17 
Image H 4 
Image I 23 
Image J 3 
Image K 23 
Image L 18 
Image M 4 
Image N 3 
Image O 2 




We can observe that in order of the most selected, the first most selected image was Image 
1 (35 times) representing a woman draped in what seems to be a black burqa, veiling her face, hair 
and shoulders and leaving her eyes visible. After it, with 23 times, comes Image 9, representing a 
Christian nun in her traditional outfit – ex aequo with Image 11 representing a woman in burkini 
walking on a beach. The images representing a woman in a hijab (Image 4) and a Sikh man in a 
turban (Image 8) were respectively selected 18 and 17 times. 
When looking at the justifications respondents gave for what they consider to be 
ostentatious, just as for the previous section, I distinguished several types of answers. Eliminating 
“filler” answers (some respondents would just type unintelligible characters just to skip to the next 
question), I collected 42 justifications. The majority of  respondents (15 respondents) deemed what 
is ostentatious is what notes clear belonging to a specific religion: “The signs I think are 
ostentatious are the signs linked to a religion, whether it is Christianism, Judaism, Sikhism, Islam, 
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etc.”, “I’ve selected the clothes that I think are religious or demonstrate affiliation to a religion,” 
“When a symbol or a piece of clothing demonstrates a religious belief, it appears as ostentatious.” 
Some of the respondents (11 respondents) argued that they didn’t see anything ostentatious 
on the picture represented because they deemed that everybody should be able to wear what they 
want: “A public space is for everyone, and for all religious affiliations. Each person should be able 
to wear what they want” or “No piece of clothing is ostentatious or all pieces of clothing are: each 
clothing is the projection of one’s own culture.” – yet, some of them nuanced their answers by 
saying that “there is a difference between public space and a public school.” 
 Another group of respondents (5 respondents) argued that they selected as ostentatious the 
signs that apply to the definition of ostentatious they found in the dictionary. One wrote: “Simply 
the definition of the word ostentatious: who aims to be noticed and to display an advantage or a 
quality” 
 Some respondents also made the distinction between what they consider to be too visible, 
or too obviously religious. A respondent that only selected Image A and Image I argued that they 
were “too visible”, another respondent who also only selected these two images wrote that he 
selected images “representing entirely religious clothing (the nun) or clothing hiding the face” and 
claimed that in his definition of ostentatious, he also noticed the “desire to “convince” or to “shock” 
people” 
 One of the images on which respondents had divided opinion was the burkini. This piece 
of clothing, similar to a wetsuit, had been the object of mediatic and political controversy earlier 
during the summer period of 2016, when several cities of France had been writing orders against 
wearing it on the beach. (Duguet 2016) In fact, a number of respondents who had justified their 
choices by selecting “religious clothing or symbols” picked the burkini picture, Image K. However, 
a few respondents also emphasized on distinguishing between “a religious object that mixes a 
religious character and design elements coming from fashion […] (like the burkini)” and a “an 
ostentatious religious piece of clothing”. 
A few respondents only selected symbols/clothing explicitly associated with Islam or non-
Western religions and cultures. A respondent who selected only Image A, K, G, L, M argued that 
“When a piece of clothing shows a religious affiliation, it is ostentatious” – yet left behind Image 
I who does show religious affiliation. A respondent who also only selected the same images wrote 
as justification that these were “Islamic symbols.” One argument, raised by a respondent who 
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selected the burqa as an ostentatious outfit, is that “the headscarf and the niqab [sic] deprive women 
of freedom and provoke the crowds”, showing bias against the headscarf (and the niqab), invoking 
women’s rights and “provocation”. 
4.3.5 Analyzing the results of the “statements” question 
In the last part of the online survey, the respondents had to read 9 statements that reflected 
diverse opinions on laïcité or the headscarf, and they had to indicate whether they agreed strongly 
(“Vraiment d’accord”), simply agreed (“D’accord”), were neutral (“Neutre”), disagreed (“Pas 
d’accord”) or disagree strongly (“Vraiment pas d’accord”) with the idea shared in the statement. 
Unlike the two previous sections, only 18 respondents answered this last section of the survey. 
The low number of respondents makes that this section of the survey is unlikely to be 
representative, but I aim to analyze the answers by looking at the respondent’s other answers in 
the previous sections. It will enable me, for instance, to understand what kind of signs, symbols or 
pieces of clothing does someone who agrees with a certain statement sees as ostentatious or is 
willing to prohibit in public spaces. 
The statements were as the following: 
1. « Il faudrait interdire le port du voile à l'université. » (“Wearing the headscarf should be 
forbidden in universities.”) 
2. « Ce qui me choque c’est l’usage et l’instrumentalisation de la laïcité à tous égards (…) 
Certains sortent des glaives pour en faire une arme contre une religion ou une autre. » 
(“What is shocking to me is the usage and the instrumentalization of laïcité in all respects 
[…] Some bring out swords to make it a weapon against a religion or another.”) 
3. « À l’origine de la loi de 1905 et de la laïcité en France, il y avait notamment la volonté de 
protéger la liberté de culte. La laïcité ne peut pas devenir une atteinte aux libertés 
personnelles. » (“At the origin of the 1905 law and laïcité in France, there was in particular 
the desire to protect freedom of cult. Laïcité cannot become an attack on personal 
freedoms.”) 
4. « Le respect de la Laïcité [...] c’est l’interdiction du port des signes religieux ostensibles 
dans tous les lieux publics. » (“Respecting laïcité means prohibiting all wearing of 
conspicuous religious signs in all public spaces.”) 
5. « Il faut faire la distinction entre ce qu’est un voile, un fichu porté par les femmes âgées, 
et la revendication d’un signe politique qui vient au fond confronter la société française. » 
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(“There must be a distinction between a veil, a scarf worn by elderly women, and the 
revindication of a political sign that essentially comes to confront the French society.”) 
6. « Il n'y a aucune raison pour que le religieux entre dans la sphère publique, c'est la loi. » 
(“There is no reason for the religious to enter the public sphere, it’s the law.”) 
7. - « Oui, je plaide pour l'interdiction du burkini dans l'espace public car c'est l'emblème 
d'une idéologie contraire à la dignité des femmes. » (“Yes, I’m pleading for the prohibition 
of the burkini in public spaces because it is the emblem of an ideology opposing women’s 
dignity.”) 
8.  « Le voile à l'école est un élément de prosélytisme qui doit être interdit. » (“The headscarf 
in school in an element of proselytism that must be forbidden.”) 
9.  «Le voile à l'école est une forme de liberté d'expression. » (“The headscarf in school is a 
form of freedom of speech.”) 
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1 - « Il faudrait interdire le port du voile à l'université. » 
 
 
# Answer % Count 
1 Vraiment pas d'accord 16.67% 3 
2 Pas d'accord 22.22% 4 
3 Neutre 16.67% 3 
4 D'accord 38.89% 7 
5 Vraiment d'accord 5.56% 1 
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2 - « Ce qui me choque c’est l’usage et l’instrumentalisation de la laïcité à tous 
égards (…) Certains sortent des glaives pour en faire une arme contre une 
religion ou une autre. » 
 
 
# Answer % Count 
1 Vraiment pas d'accord 5.56% 1 
2 Pas d'accord 16.67% 3 
3 Neutre 33.33% 6 
4 D'accord 27.78% 5 
5 Vraiment d'accord 16.67% 3 









3 - « À l’origine de la loi de 1905 et de la laïcité en France, il y avait 
notamment la volonté de protéger la liberté de culte. La laïcité ne peut pas 
devenir une atteinte aux libertés personnelles. » 
 
 
# Answer % Count 
1 Vraiment pas d'accord 0.00% 0 
2 Pas d'accord 5.56% 1 
3 Neutre 22.22% 4 
4 D'accord 66.67% 12 
5 Vraiment d'accord 5.56% 1 
 Total 100% 18 
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4 - « Le respect de la Laïcité [...] c’est l’interdiction du port des signes 
religieux ostensibles dans tous les lieux publics. » 
 
 
# Answer % Count 
1 Vraiment pas d'accord 5.56% 1 
2 Pas d'accord 22.22% 4 
3 Neutre 16.67% 3 
4 D'accord 38.89% 7 
5 Vraiment d'accord 16.67% 3 
 Total 100% 18 
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5 - « Il faut faire la distinction entre ce qu’est un voile, un fichu porté par les 
femmes âgées, et la revendication d’un signe politique qui vient au fond 
confronter la société française. » 
 
 
# Answer % Count 
1 Vraiment pas d'accord 0.00% 0 
2 Pas d'accord 5.56% 1 
3 Neutre 22.22% 4 
4 D'accord 50.00% 9 
5 Vraiment d'accord 22.22% 4 
 Total 100% 18 
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6 - « Il n'y a aucune raison pour que le religieux entre dans la sphère 
publique, c'est la loi. » 
 
 
# Answer % Count 
1 Vraiment pas d'accord 0.00% 0 
2 Pas d'accord 16.67% 3 
3 Neutre 16.67% 3 
4 D'accord 44.44% 8 
5 Vraiment d'accord 22.22% 4 
 Total 100% 18 
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7 - « Oui, je plaide pour l'interdiction du burkini dans l'espace public car c'est 
l'emblème d'une idéologie contraire à la dignité des femmes. » 
 
 
# Answer % Count 
1 Vraiment pas d'accord 22.22% 4 
2 Pas d'accord 22.22% 4 
3 Neutre 27.78% 5 
4 D'accord 22.22% 4 
5 Vraiment d'accord 5.56% 1 
 Total 100% 18 
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8 - « Le voile à l'école est un élément de prosélytisme qui doit être interdit. » 
 
 
# Answer % Count 
1 Vraiment pas d'accord 0.00% 0 
2 Pas d'accord 25.00% 1 
3 Neutre 75.00% 3 
4 D'accord 0.00% 0 
5 Vraiment d'accord 0.00% 0 
 Total 100% 4 
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9 - «Le voile à l'école est une forme de liberté d'expression. » 
 
 
# Answer % Count 
1 Vraiment pas d'accord 25.00% 1 
2 Pas d'accord 25.00% 1 
3 Neutre 50.00% 2 
4 D'accord 0.00% 0 
5 Vraiment d'accord 0.00% 0 
 Total 100% 4 
 
Certain points are interesting to observe. It would seem that most of the respondents who 
answered the first question would like the headscarf to be forbidden in universities as well (7 
respondents, 38.89%), but there is also a similar proportion of respondents who disagree or 
disagree strongly (4 respondents disagree, 3 respondents disagree strongly) with this opinion. Yet, 
when asked about the statement that states that laïcité means prohibiting “conspicuous religious 
symbols in all public spaces”, the majority agreeing with this statement is clearer (“Vraiment 
d’accord” and “D’accord” combined totalize 10 respondents, while “Pas d’accord” and “Vraiment 
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pas d’accord” combined only get 5 respondents.) It would seem that, when combined with the 
answers to the “situations” question, respondents perceive laïcité as a principle that indeed applies 
to all religions equally, but that still nonetheless forbids religious symbols in public spaces 
 When the statements deal more explicitly with the issue of the headscarf (Statements 8 and 
9), the majority seems to remain neutral. In fact, for statement 9, 2 respondents answered “Neutral”, 
while 2 respondents answered “Disagree” and “Strongly disagree” respectively. However, given 
the fact that only 4 respondents in total answered these two last questions, I prefer not to give the 
results of these two statements as much interpretive value as the other statements. 
I was interested in looking at the previous answers of people who answered “D’accord” to 
the statement that argued in favor of a prohibition of the veil in universities. Two respondents 
selected that he would forbid the clothing represented in Image A (the burqa) that he considered 
“to be like imposing one’s religion to another”, but he did not select the hijab represented in Image 
L as ostentatious or as an object that should be forbidden in public spaces. Another respondent’s 
answer to the “what should be forbidden” question wrote “All religious signs should be forbidden 
in public spaces,” and selected all religious signs (as well as the burkini) in the set of images. 
Another respondent who had responded that people should wear whatever they wanted in public 
spaces in the earlier set of questions also said he was supported the statement for the interdiction 
of the headscarf in the university. This allowed me to hypothesize there are respondents who are 
strongly against all forms of religious expression in all public spaces, but there are also respondents 
who see the burqa as well as the burkini specifically as imposing a religion on other people. They 
didn’t selected the hijab, yet opposed its presence in universities. Why is that? Was there 
something unique to universities that made them different public spaces? The question was raised 
when Manuel Valls, former Prime Minister, reopened the debate in 2016, stating he supported the 
prohibition, when legally this prohibition would probably difficult to apply (Le Floc’h 2016)  Was 
the hijab not considered as ostentatious by some of these respondents? While I am not able to make 
conclusions about the reasons behind their choices, I am nonetheless able to observe that the 
considerations of ostentatiousness vary greatly, even in a group where a majority of respondents 
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4.3.6 Conclusions of the online survey 
It would seem that on the topic of laïcité, and the way it is applied within public schools, 
most respondents have an understanding of its importance. Laïcité does not allow for 
discriminations, and even if a minority of respondents strongly supported a form of discrimination 
against Muslim students, the majority argued that both situations were unjust and should apply 
equally to students regardless of religion. Some respondents even implied in their responses to the 
“situations” questions a vague feeling of discrimination existing against French Muslims in real 
life: “This means to establish the idea that one religion has more value than another, on the basis 
of uncertain criteria […] How can a united society […] build itself if some of its members are 
considered to be second zone citizens due to their religion?”  
However, an important question is raised when looking at the results of the “what is 
ostentatious/what should be forbidden” survey. In fact, the results reveal more diversity in what 
people conceive to be “ostentatious” as I had imagined. If a majority of respondents see 
ostentatious character in what is visibly a religious symbol or piece of clothing, there is still a great 
number of respondents who answered that nothing should be considered ostentatious and that 
people should have the right to wear what they want in the street. Of course, they could have a 
different opinion when it comes to “ostentatiousness” in a public school – like one respondent 
pointed out. Another group of respondents selected as “ostentatious” only what was considered to 
be a danger to safety – i.e. if it hid a person’s face, like the burqa represented in Image A. Even in 
the group of respondents who deemed religious signs to be ostentatious, there were nonetheless 
differences in what people deemed to be “too visible”: while some respondents deemed any object 
associated with a religion to be “ostentatious”, other respondents argued that “a simple cross or a 
veil” were “discreet signs”. One respondent argued that a nun outfit was not ostentatious, because 
it constituted her “work outfit, as an ecclesiastical” – while another respondent argued that a nun 
outfit was ostentatious because it constituted an entirely religious outfit. Just like the previous set 
of questions, a minority of respondents only decided to select the symbols or outfits that were 
exclusively “Islamic” or at least non-Western (a respondent justified his choice by writing he 
selected “Islamic” outfits only, yet also selected the picture representing a Sikh man, Image G. I 
can only guess that it is either ignorance, or enlarging his choice of “ostentatious” to anything non-
Western.) As such, the results of this survey, even if made on a very small scale, allow me to raise 
important doubts on the notion of “ostentatiousness/conspicuousness.” The 2004 law prohibits 
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“ostentatious” religious symbols, leaving the care of deciding whether or not a specific symbol, 
accessory, or piece of clothing can be considered ostentatious or not to the professor or the school 
administrator. The law does not provide directions or measures on what is objectively conspicuous, 
and as such the application of the law is left to the sentiment of the individual applying it in school. 
The majority of the respondents acknowledge that asking a Muslim student to remove her 
headscarf while leaving a Christian student to wear her cross necklace is unfair – yet, the 
distinction of ostentatiousness remains nonetheless subjective, and while in the minority, some 
respondents still displayed explicitly bias against Muslim students and Muslim symbols and 
clothing. 
Another question raised by the results of this online survey was a simple, yet crucial one: 
what makes an object religious? This issue was posed specifically with the burkini, on which some 
respondents argued that it was a “mixing religion and elements of fashion”, while some selected 
Image K in their answer to the “what is ostentatious/what should be forbidden” and argued it was 
part of religious symbols that were forcing religion on others. On the opposite, some didn’t select 
Image K when selecting what they thought to be religious. The question remains: is the burkini 
religious because the person wearing it is Muslim? If yes, does that mean the ostentatious nature 
of an object reside in the intentions of the person wearing it? An interesting case, in 2015, opposing 
a Muslim girl and her school’s intentions, came to question this. In April 2015, a Muslim middle 
school student, Sarah K., was impeded to attend classes several times by the administration of the 
Léo Lagrange middle school in the region of Charleville-Mezieres despite her removing her hijab 
before entering the school – on the grounds that the long black skirt she was wearing was also part 
of a religious attire. The girl argued with the school’s administration, arguing that her long skirt 
was just “simple, not ostentatious. There’s no religious sign at all.” (Chadenat 2015) This case 
attracted mediatic attention and several citizens called for a “Long Day Skirt” in protest of the 
young girl’s initial prohibition to attend classes wearing the skirt. Later in the year, two other 
similar cases arose in which Muslim schoolgirls were impeded access to the school despite the fact 
that they had removed their headscarf because of their long skirt. In fact, the argument on which a 
long black skirt can be proved to be a religious symbol if worn by a Muslim schoolgirl reinforces 
the idea that the law (or should I say, the professors enforcing it) end up giving religious 
significance to a piece of clothing that is not attached to a specific religion. If a student known to 
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be non-Muslim was wearing the same skirt, would the skirt be considered by the school 
administration as a basis for impeding a student to attend classes? I strongly think it would not. 
This is where the 2004 law reveals its limitations, as it seems to have enabled biases and 
confusions that disproportionately affect Muslim students, and specifically young Muslim girls. 
This confusion is similar to the reasoning behind pointing out to the burkini in my qualitative 
online survey as an ostentatious symbol: the respondents who pointed at the picture of the burkini 
as conspicuous because of its religious nature are in fact giving a religious meaning to a piece of 
clothing that was not considered religious. As many argued during the burkini controversy in 2016, 
how is a burkini different than a typical wetsuit, except for the fact that it is worn by Muslim 
women? The 2004 law applies when the symbol or the sign is a religious one, therefore raising the 
following question: what makes a symbol or a piece of clothing religious? Is it the actual or known 
religion of the wearer or the intention behind wearing one? If it is the former, as it is in the Sarah 
K.’s case, it means the law is enabling distinctions to be made between students who wear the 
same piece of clothing depending on their religion, thus enabling discrimination against students 
who are known to be or perceived to be Muslim. On the other hand, if it is on the latter basis, how 
can the intention of the wearer be assumed? For instance, when we refer to the pictures used in the 
online survey, can we assume the intention of the blonde woman wearing a scarf around her hair, 
or even the intent of the young man wearing a “COEXIST” t-shirt made of different religious 
symbols? Are they wearing it for a religious or political or practical purpose? These are questions 
a law would not be able to answer. At the same time, it would also mean that the 2004 law should 
not be based on the religiosity of the symbols or the signs, but on the intent of the person – leading 
towards a more case-by-case legal jurisprudence, closer to what the State Council was doing from 
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IV – CONCLUSIVE REMARKS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Freedom of religion and separation between Church and State are essential principles in 
order to maintain a strong democracy, and the principle of laïcité, as it is inscribed in the 
Constitution, was created with that aim in mind. It remains nowadays a pillar of the French 
Republic; yet, it is not without its own flaws. Laïcité remains a concept that has as many definitions, 
meanings and interpretations as there is as many intellectuals, politicians, school teachers or 
citizens. It remains a principle that all French agree to say it is crucial to society, yet don’t seem to 
agree on its meaning or its application. Is laïcité a legal reality? A philosophy? A set of rules? 
Olivier Roy defines laïcité as a total sum of laws in his book Secularism Confronts Islam, but also 
writes that laïcité – in its initial 1905 application and as of now – is not entirely the separation of 
the State and religions as “our secularized societies are haunted by the religious” (Roy 25)  But 
El-Haggar writes that laïcité is “a philosophical concept” (19), while Hendaz defines it as a 
“Kantian concept based on reason and universality” (81) The malleability and the shadow of 
confusion surrounding laïcité makes it a weapon that can be indeed used against a religion or 
another. When turning to the 1905 law and the context of its creation, Olivier Roy argues that the 
French society shifted from displaying Catholicism as the enemy in 1905(“clericalism, that’s the 
enemy!”) (Roy 2) to now Islam being pointed as the threat to public order and the foundations of 
laïcité. But more importantly, the debates on the place of Islam and its visible expressions (the 
most discussed being the headscarf) in French society have been “involved in the reshaping of the 
French political and intellectual landscape.” (Roy 2) This can be observed in political discourses, 
especially amplified during periods preceding presidential elections, and this since 2007. “Islam” 
and “laïcité” are two topics often brought together in the media, and even more so during elections 
period. As an example, during the primaries of the Socialist Party (to which belongs the current 
President, Francois Hollande), laïcité was one of the major issues dividing Benoit Hamon and 
Manuel Valls, the two candidates for the April 2017 elections. Valls, who declared the headscarf 
to be a “subjugation of women”, inscribes laïcité in a “battle against communautarisms and for 
women’s rights” (Le Monde Jan. 2017). On the other hand, his opponent, Hamon, believes that 
“we should stop to make an issue out of Islam”, what Le Monde calls an “appeased conception of 
laïcité, by avoiding to pit French citizens against each other.” I would like to argue that Hamon 
and Valls incarnate two confronting visions of laïcité in the French political sphere. Benoit Hamon 
affirms wanting to stay “true” to the 1905 law, by guaranteeing “a laïcité that aimed to allow those 
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who believe and who don’t to freely exercise it  and by assuring the neutrality of the public powers 
and the State, no more and no less” (Le Monde 2017) On the other hand, Manuel Valls affirms to 
go beyond the 1905 law and aimed in his program to create a “Chart of Laïcité” and adding it to 
the Constitution. Another vision even, is that of Marine Le Pen, who made one of her campaign 
promises to add the mention “The Republic defends no community” to the Constitution, a 
proposition her detractors have declared to be clearly aimed against the French Muslim population.  
Disagreements on what laïcité consists of still persist, and so do debates on whether to 
extend the 2004 law’s prohibition of conspicuous religious signs to other public places. Ultimately, 
the answer resides in how the French society defines what constitutes “neutrality” – because this 
notion is essential in the definition of the 2004 law. The law puts the accent on the word 
“conspicuous”, leaving it up to professors to decide which signs and which symbols can be 
considered conspicuous or ostentatious. Is ostentatious really synonym with visible? As Laborde 
argues in Critical Republicanism, the criterion of ostentation is made “against the backdrop of 
specific, non-neutral, cultural contexts. A Muslim hijab is ‘ostentatious’ in Paris in a way in which 
it is not in Casablanca, where, by contrast, smaller Christian crosses are likely to stand out.” (63) 
The notions of what is “ostentatious” or “conspicuous are rooted in cultural, non-neutral and thus 
non-laic contexts – and a law cannot be based on a simple “impression of visual aggression by the 
outward expression of an unfamiliar and foreign religion.” (Laborde 63) 
 This is an argument similar to what Régis Debray, former member of the Stasi 
Commission makes in a letter to Jacques Chirac in 2003. He writes a short yet relevant passage 
concerning the politics of multiculturalism in France. In fact, Debray is strongly in favor of a law 
concerning religious signs in schools, yet, by intellectual honesty, devotes several chapters listing 
the arguments against the introduction of the new legislation. As the 2004 law is still being 
discussed, he discusses the argument according to which France should not ignore the cultural and 
historical context in which a law aiming to ban religious symbols and clothing in schools would 
be inscribed. Debray argues the veil was a question not solely about the place of religious 
expression in the French society, but also about the French society’s perception of immigrant 
populations coming from its former, Muslim-majority colonies. He writes: “There is an obscure 
link between a “civilizing” universalism and a contemptuous colonialism, and the republican 
discourse must one day clear up their colonial inhibitions. […] France […] does not have the 
luxury of multiculturalism, more accessible to short histories and large territories, but there is 
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nothing but benefits for her to recognize, by symbolic positive measures, cultural rights neglected 
until now: the ability to choose one’s holidays according to their religious traditions, facilitation 
of downtown construction and financing permits for mosques” (20) Despite being an eloquent 
advocate for the 2004 law, he reminds that it inscribes itself in a context in which France has not 
entirely gotten rid of its historical bias, yet it remains in denial about it. Gaspard and Khosrokhavar 
make a similar observation when pointing out that “despite constant immigration and the 
progressive installation of an important fraction of migrants, it is striking to see that France has 
denied, since the 19th century, its aspect as a country of population-swelling immigration (167) I 
am not discussing in this paper the benefits or the disadvantages of multiculturalism or of any 
previous immigration policies: this question deserves its own entire thesis, not to mention that this 
question has been addressed academically by political philosophers (Taylor, Kymlicka), political 
scientists (Song, Modood), and historians (Mouhoud). However, I am focusing on the ways in 
which a law dealing with universalistic language and a seemingly universalistic goal (the 
prohibition of all religious symbols in public schools) ends up having a differential impact, due 
notably to the fact that the law was born from discussions and issues in which only the Islamic 
headscarf was seen as the “issue” to be solved. If it is not my place to discuss whether or not the 
Islamic veil – or any other religious symbol worn by students – whether it represents a danger to 
the values of the Republican school, or whether it is a symbol of religious proselytization or of the 
“Islamisation” of France, this paper aimed bringing forth the contradiction between the wording 
of a law and its de facto application. Even if the law equally discriminates against all religious 
symbols and pieces of clothing, and even if it was not formally proven that the most affected by 
the law are young Muslim girls wearing the veil, the consequences and the effects of it remain an 
issue. In fact, the 2004s law stemmed from a mostly negative vision of the Islamic headscarf, as 
several politicians, intellectuals and medias associated it with Islamic patriarchy, radical Islamist 
groups, and an immigrant “threat”. Through the proceedings of the Stasi commission in 2003, the 
focus of the law remained the Islamic headscarf; yet only two Muslim girls were brought to the 
discussion table and their experiences and opinions were not heard by the lawmakers in charge of 
a law that was, after all, concerned primarily with their religious clothing. This fact brings up a 
crucial question concerning the disconnect between citizens and lawmakers, and the actual goal of 
laws in a democracy. More importantly, the gap between the universal language used in the 2004 
law and its initial intention of providing a solution to the headscarf controversies is worth 
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questioning. If it is possible to imagine that French legislators did not want to write a law 
forbidding only the Islamic headscarf to avoid public accusations of discriminative policy and 
sanctions emanating from the European Court of Human Rights, the negative effects of the law 
have been mainly falling on Muslim schoolgirls, and to an extent on the French Muslim 
community in its entirety who have been feeling the impact of negative stereotypes, ideas and 
perceptions of Islam being propagated in the French society. 
The little scale of my qualitative surveys and interviews does not allow me to come up with 
strong and decisive evidence that Muslim populations are more disproportionately affected than 
other religious groups by the law. However, combined with the literature review from Chapters I, 
II and somewhat in III, I am able to draw hints, pieces of evidence that show the ways in which 
the law is inscribed in a broader discourse affecting and targeted in fact against the headscarf, 
affecting the Muslim community as a whole.  
Going back to Model 1, have proven all the drawn links to be true? In Chapter II, I have 
established the link and the ways in which the political and mediatic debates centered on Islam 
and on girls wearing the headscarf influenced the steps that led to the 2004 law – the 1989 and 
1994 directives, and even the Stasi commission’s focus. In Chapter II and III, I have shown how 
these same political and mediatic debates focusing on Islam and the headscarf have given way to 
islamophobic attitudes affecting mostly Muslim women. The link between “Islamophobic 
Opinions and Attitudes” and “Application of the Law” is more complicated: as I have not been 
able to produce data on this point (i.e. interviewing teachers or school administrators), I 
nonetheless questioned the idea of “ostentatiousness” along with Laborde’s points and argued that 
the criterion of “ostentatious” was surely biased against Muslim symbols such as the headscarf. 
The online surveys in III also allowed me to question the notion of “ostentatiousness” and doubt 
the objectivity of this criterion, as well as what makes an object a religious object or not. It doesn’t 
prove the existence of this link, but brings a doubt on the ways biases and subjective judgment 
might influence the application of the law when deciding on what is “ostentatious”. Finally, the 
link between the application of the law and “discrimination sentiment” can be drawn from the 
stories told in Chapter II, as well as some of the interviews I have done in Chapter III.  
Of course, I do realize that the small scale of my interviews and online survey is quite small, 
thus causality cannot be proven. However, I hope the elements I have brought up and put together 
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in this research will allow for a better contextual understanding of the 2004 law and the principle 
of laïcité and its relation to French Muslims. 
5.1. Policy Recommendations 
As this paper reaches its end, I want to finish with some important observations and 
recommendations concerning policy-making and the ways in which European/Western societies 
deal with multiculturalism and religious diversity within their territories. The history France has 
entertained with Islam is complex, and finds its roots in a long history of colonial and post-
colonial relationships with the first wave of immigrants coming from former colonies composed 
Muslim-majority populations. In her article “Islamophobie : la fabrique d’un nouveau concept. 
État des lieux de la recherche,” the French sociologist Houda Asal writes that there is a 
“specificity to the French context” and that we should “take different dimensions simultaneously 
in order to analyze islamophobia in France,” because France’s relation to Islam and its Muslim 
population is linked to its colonial and migration history; because a large part of the Muslim 
populations come from this migration history and from working classes, and also because 
Muslim women have been at the center of the debate and the biggest victims of islamophobia. 
(Asal 11)  
I would first like to address the law at the center of this thesis: the 2004 law. Given the 
context of its establishment, would I be able to say it is a “bad” law? Should it be abrogated? 
Similarly to the people I have interviewed, I am able to see the reasons behind the law, as well as 
its actual effects. The major rationale behind the law was that the headscarf was an object of 
“submission” or “subjugation” for several young girls, and that the law would allow to liberate 
them (Stasi), and that ostentatious religious signs or symbols are a form of proselytism. The first 
claim would need to be discussed in a sociology or even a psychology thesis, and measuring 
whether or not even the women who made the conscious choice to wear the headscarf despite 
opposite opinions from their families are playing into subconscious submission to “Islamic 
patriarchy” is beyond my means. I would disagree with the second claim however: proselytism 
results from a behavior in my opinion, not a symbol or an appearance. I have previously 
discussed the ambiguity in what makes a symbol or a piece of clothing “religious” as well. The 
2004 law, even if I would recommend its abrogation for these personal reasons, would not be 
possible to be abrogated. First, it is a law a great number of French citizens approve of – 85% of 
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them in 2015 approve of the law (Portier 270) – and it is a law that, as the results of my online 
survey show, respondents understand and approve of, even if they oppose blatant discrimination 
as pictured in the “situations” questions.  In fact, there is a difference to be made between 
“blatant” discrimination as it is pictured when a professor refuses to apply the same law equally 
to two students of different religions – and “situational” unfairness, more insidious yet still as 
impactful when a law is created to answer to the “issue of the headscarf,” yet decides to forbid 
all religious signs and symbols in school – affecting the public perception of Islam, which was 
already negatively viewed as the “religion of the other/the immigrant” to a religion “of women’s 
subjugation and terrorism”.  
As such, even if I am opposed to the law, I would not recommend abrogating it in the 
current French socio-political context. However, it is essential that French political classes, as well 
as the French public, gain awareness of this form of unfairness – but looking at recent  news, it 
seems that history might be repeating itself. A late ruling of the European Court of Justice declared 
that headscarves could be banned in workplaces, as long the prohibition arose “from an internal 
rule of a private undertaking prohibiting the visible wearing of any political, philosophical or 
religious sign in the workplace” (Court of Justice of the European Union 2017 4), specifying 
however that in the absence of such an internal rule, prohibiting the Islamic headscarf “cannot be 
considered an occupational requirement that could rule out discrimination. (1) This ruling ensued 
the discussion of two cases, each opposing a Muslim woman to their previous employers – one 
opposing a Belgian Muslim woman, Samira Achbita and her receptionist company; the other 
opposing Asma Bougnaoui, a French Muslim woman and the company in which she worked as a 
design engineer. Similar to the discussions preceding the establishment of the 2004 law, it seems 
that the attention comes from cases in which the Islamic headscarf was at the center of the issue. 
This recent legal decision allows me to draw on two points on which I want to emit policy 
recommendations, not solely for France, but also for Europe and other countries of “Western 
tradition” dealing with Muslim populations. 
My first policy recommendation concerns the mediatic treatment of French and European 
Muslim populations in these countries. The judicial decision of European Court is remindful of 
the first steps that led to the creation of the 2004 law. Similarly to the events of 1989 and 1994, it 
is a single object (the headscarf) that has become the root of a possible measure that would use 
“universalistic” language (in the case of the European Court decision, the right to ban all 
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religious, political and philosophical signs and symbols) Nonetheless, the decision of the court 
was titled in the media as an action against the headscarf. Le Monde titled its report on the 
decision “Europe: companies can forbid the headscarf under conditions” and featured a picture 
of a woman in a headscarf, turning away from the camera. A Huffington Post France article title 
does not make a direct reference to the veil, yet the cover picture of the article shows another 
woman in an headscarf. Even if the European decision seems at this stage, far from becoming a 
national rule or law, I believe it is important to be careful when looking at the mediatic discourse 
surrounding the headscarf and Muslim populations in Europe. As seen in the 1989, 2002, 2003 
and countless other cases opposing headscarf-wearing Muslim schoolgirls to school 
administrations, the extensive mediatic coverage was one of the factors accentuating the feeling 
of threat and danger, and of abnormality in the presence of the headscarves in schools. Major 
newspapers in France (well-known names such as Le Point, L’Express, Le Nouvel Obs) as well 
as audiovisual media played an important role in the transmission of the typical image of the 
headscarf-wearing Muslim schoolgirl. By aligning reports on veils in schools with Islamist 
danger, the risk of terrorism, the dangers of immigrations, social and economic insecurity in 
suburbs, media was transmitting a limited narrative surrounding young girls wearing the veil that 
may not be entirely representative of the variety of women and young girls deciding to wear the 
veil. Even more recently, in the summer-fall 2012 period, more than six covers from L’Express, 
Le Point or the periodical Valeurs Actuelles bore words like “The Occident against Islam”, “The 
Fear of Islam”, “Islam: Uncomfortable Truths”, “The Islamist Specter”, “Why Is Islam Scary”, 
“This Shameless Islam” (Diallo 2012) Read by thousands each day, covers and articles like these 
fuel a fear of Islam, of the headscarf, and a fear of the religious that is not always justified. The 
general opinion on Islam and the integration of French Muslims keeps decreasing. In fact, in 
1989, 37% of French citizens considered that the cohabitation between the immigrant’s traditions 
and French culture was difficult. (Portier 269) In 2013, 74% of people interrogated thought that 
Islam is a religion “incompatible” with the values of the French society. (269) This trend is 
surprising when contrasted with the 71% of Muslims that accept the values of French society, 
including laïcité and the respect of national laws above religious laws. (El Karoui 2016) I do not 
advocate for hindrances to press freedom or freedom of expression. Nonetheless, it is necessary 
that societies remain aware of the power of media exercise on public opinion when they 
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dramatize and emphasize one side to an issue, or when they focus on a threat to link it to a whole 
community of French citizens. 
Secondly, I argue that the issue at the center of these two cases is the French definition of 
laïcité, as well as the European vision of religious neutrality. In fact, let’s observe the argument 
brought forth by the two companies concerned in the European Court of Justice ruling to prohibit 
the wearing of the headscarf. The company involved in the case opposing it to Samira Achbita 
informed her that “the wearing of the headscarf would not be tolerated because the visible wearing 
of political, philosophical or religious signs was contrary to the position of neutrality G4S [the 
company] adopted in its contracts with its customers” (Court of Justice of the European Union 
2017 1), while the company opposing Asma Bougnaoui “informed her that the wearing of an 
Islamic headscarf might pose a problem when she was in contact with customers of the company” 
(3) The question at hand lies in how the headscarf is perceived by the customer of the company, 
and the wish of the company for “neutrality”. In the case of the Belgian company G4S, it is clear 
that the company has a policy of neutrality for all expressions – political, philosophical and 
religious. One might argue that, given the nature of the Achbita’s work as a receptionist, she has 
to offer a neutral image to customers, as she represents a company without any religious, political 
or philosophical affiliation. Yet, is “neutrality” really the absence of a headscarf or of a cross? 
Companies and public services in Anglo-Saxon countries who may have requirements of neutrality 
quite different from France or Belgium – in positions such as police officer or postman – allow for 
religious symbols like a headscarf or a Sikh turban. 
If I wish to leave my personal opinion outside of this analysis and remain neutral (pun 
intended) on the question of which form of “religious neutrality” is better, I do remain convinced 
that in the case of France, a national re-questioning on the meaning of laïcité, what it implies, and 
its consequences on religious and non-religious citizens in their daily lives remains necessary. It 
might end on a questioning that will not lead to clear answers, but the value of that exercise remains 
in its practice. Depending on who is speaking as well as who you’re speaking to, laïcité can be the 
legal, philosophical or socio-political concept that defines the space of religion in the public sphere 
or the relations it has with the State. However, in the current state of affairs, it has come to englobe 
issues of immigration, racism, islamophobia and challenges to multiculturalism in France – but 
also in other European countries. Opposing the Anglo-Saxon secularism model to the French 
laïcité model has been done many times, yet, it is time we draw from both models in order to find 
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a model of secularism that “embraces all religions without fear or favour” (Husain and Welby 
2015) and respects the religious practice of citizens within legal boundaries without trampling on 
their freedoms for the sake of an impression or a bias.  
It is easy to wonder how, and even if “Islam is compatible with our Western values” – a 
question asked to French citizens and to which 56% of them answered negatively in a 2016 poll 
(Paris Match 2016) – when ignoring a French Muslin population that in its majority, respects the 
values and the freedoms that allow them to practice their religion. It is essential that we, Western 
societies, as we are facing multiple self-questionings on the issues of identity, domestic safety, 
relationship with our history, interrogate ourselves on our historical legacies, biases, antagonisms 


























 "18 Septembre Au 22 Décembre 1989 : Un Automne En France Et Dans Le Monde." Ed. 
Alain Seksig and Philippe Dewitt. Hommes et Migrations n°1129-1130, February-March 
1990. www.persee.fr/doc/agora_1268-5666_2002_num_28_1_1983 
 "Définitions : Définition de Islamophobie." Editions Larousse. 
www.larousse.fr/dictionnaires/francais/islamophobie/186470 
 "EU Workplace Headscarf Ban 'can Be Legal', Says ECJ." BBC News. BBC, 14 March 
2017. www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-39264845 
 "La Constitution Du 4 Octobre 1958." Conseil Constitutionnel. Web. www.conseil-
constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francais/la-constitution/la-constitution-du-4-
octobre-1958/texte-integral-de-la-constitution-du-4-octobre-1958-en-vigueur.5074.html 
 "Laïcité et port de signes religieux à l’école." Eurel. 26 Sept. 2012. 
www.eurel.info/spip.php?article1007 




 "Religious Demographics Of France." WorldAtlas. WorldAtlas, 21 July 2016. 
www.worldatlas.com/articles/religious-demographics-of-france.html 
 . www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/storage/rapports-publics/064000177.pdf 
 “ LOI n° 2004-228 du 15 mars 2004 encadrant, en application du principe de laïcité, le 
port de signes ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, 
collèges et lycées publics.” Legifrance, 2004. .  
www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000417977&dateTexte
=&categorieLien=id 
 “Rétrocontroverse: 1989, la République laïque face au foulard islamique.” Le Monde, 
August 2nd, 2007. www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2007/08/02/retrocontroverse-1989-la-
republique-laique-face-au-foulard-islamique_941317_3232.html 
 Asal, Houda. “Islamophobie : la fabrique d'un nouveau concept. État des lieux de la 
Dos Santos Quaresma 69 
 
 
 Bobineau, Olivier, and Stéphane Lathion. Les Musulmans, Une Menace Pour La 
République? Paris: Desclée De Brouwer, 2012.  
 Bowen, John R. Why the French Don't like Headscarves: Islam, the State, and Public 
Space. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2007. 
 Bronner, Luc. "La « Loi Sur Le Voile » marque l’aboutissement d’un long débat sur la 
laïcité." Le Monde, August 31st, 2004. International ed.: p.4. Print. 
 Chadenat, Tatiana. "Exclue du collège pour une jupe trop longue." Madame Figaro. 29 
Apr. 2015.  madame.lefigaro.fr/societe/exclue-du-college-pour-une-jupe-trop-longue-
280415-96389 
 Chérifi, Hanoufa. “Application de la Loi du 15 Mars 2004 sur le port des signes religieux 
ostensibles dans les établissements d’enseignement publics. Rapport à Monsieur le 
ministre de l’éducation nationale, de l’enseignement supérieur et de la recherché.” July 
2005. La Documentation Française. 
www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/storage/rapports-publics/064000177.pdf 
 Court of Justice of the European Union. "Press Release No 30/17." CURIA (2017): 
CURIA. curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2017-03/cp170030en.pdf. 
 Cue, Eduardo. "For France, Girls In Head Scarves Threaten Secular Ideals." The 
Christian Science Monitor. 5 Oct.1994. www.csmonitor.com/1994/1005/05012.html 
 Debray, Régis. Ce que nous voile le voile: La République Et Le Sacré. Paris: Gallimard, 
2003.  
 Diallo, Rokhaya. "L'islam Et Les Médias : Cet Acharnement Sans Gêne." Le Plus L'Obs. 
11 Oct. 2012. leplus.nouvelobs.com/contribution/690696-l-islam-et-les-medias-cet-
acharnement-sans-gene.html 
 Doerschler, Peter, and Pamela Irving Jackson. Benchmarking Muslim well-being in 
Europe: reducing disparities and polarizations. Bristol: Policy Press, 2012. 
 Duguet, Margaux. "Le Burkini à La Plage, Une Interdiction Qui Fait Des Vagues." 
Europe 1. Europe 1, August 15th, 2016. www.europe1.fr/societe/le-burkini-a-la-plage-
une-interdiction-qui-fait-des-vagues-2821498 
 Education Nationale, Jeunesse et Sports. "Circulaire du 20 septembre 1994. Neutralité de 
l’enseignement public: port de signes ostentatoires dans les établissements scolaires." 





 Education Nationale, Jeunesse et Sports. “Circulaire du 12 décembre 1989. Laïcité, port 
de signes religieux par les élèves et caractère obligatoire des enseignements.” Assemblée 
Nationale. www.assemblee-nationale.fr/12/dossiers/documents-laicite/document-2.pdf 
 El Karoui, Hakim. "Un Islam Français Est Possible." Institut Montaigne, Sept. 2016. 
www.institutmontaigne.org/fr/publications/un-islam-francais-est-possible 
 El-Haggar, Nabil. La laïcité, ce précieux concept. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2008. Print. 
 Faut-il laisser entrer l’islam à l’école?” Le Point, 16 Oct. 1989 
 Gaspard, Françoise; Khosrokhavar, Farhad. Le foulard et la République. Paris: Editions 
La Découverte. 1995. 
 Hendaz Larabi, Louisa. Le voile humilié ou les auditions manquées de la Commission 
Stasi. Editions Marjane: Paris. 2005. 
 Husain, Ed, and Peter Welby. "Down with La Laïcité - to Beat Islamism, We Need a 
Secularism That Encourages Religion." The Spectator. The Spectator, 16 Jan. 2015. 
blogs.spectator.co.uk/2015/01/down-with-la-laicite-to-beat-islamism-we-need-a-
secularism-that-encourages-religion 
 INA, “L’affaire du foulard islamique en 1989.” 5 Oct. 1989. fresques.ina.fr/jalons/fiche-
media/InaEdu01136/l-affaire-du-foulard-islamique-en-1989.html 
 INA, “LA KIPPA”. France 2, 20 Sept. 1994. www.ina.fr/video/CAB94093550/la-kippa-
video.html 
 Khalifa, Frank. Difficile Laïcité: Sources Et Enjeux. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014.  
 Laborde, Cécile. Critical Republicanism: The Hijab Controversy and Political 
Philosophy. Oxford University Press, 2008. 
 Le Monde. Rescan, Manon, and Lucie Soullier. "Hamon Et Valls : Deux Conceptions De 
La Laïcité." Le Monde, 25 Jan. 2017. www.lemonde.fr/primaire-de-la-
gauche/article/2017/01/24/hamon-et-valls-deux-conceptions-de-la-
laicite_5068441_5008374.html#meter_toaster 
 Le Point. "Ce Voile Qui Dérange." Le Point, 15 Dec. 2005. Web. 01 Apr. 2017. 
www.lepoint.fr/actualites-societe/2007-01-17/ce-voile-qui-derange/920/0/24781 
Dos Santos Quaresma 71 
 
 
 Meiers, Heather. “Difference and Laïcité: France’s Headscarf Debates and the Banning 
of Religious Symbols in French Public Schools.” University of Kansas, 2007. 
 Meziti, Kamel. Dictionnaire de l’islamophobie. Bayard : Paris. 2013 
 Nakad, Nahida. Derrière le Voile. Paris: Don Quichotte. 2013.  
 Ottenheimer, Ghislaine, Le Quotidien de Paris. 13 June 1989. Print.  
 Paveau, Marie-Anne. "Journée De La Jupe Longue : Sarah, Julie Gayet, NKM... Ce 
Vêtement Est Politique." L'Obs Le Plus. Le Nouvel Observateur, 07 May 2016. 
leplus.nouvelobs.com/contribution/1363344-journee-de-la-jupe-longue-sarah-julie-gayet-
nkm-ce-vetement-est-politique.html 
 Pew Research Center, “Europeans Fear Wave of Refugees Will Mean More Terrorism, 
Fewer Jobs”. 11 July 2016. assets.pewresearch.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/2/2016/07/Pew-Research-Center-EU-Refugees-and-National-
Identity-Report-FINAL-July-11-2016.pdf 
 Piettre, Pauline. “Catéchèse et instruction religieuse en France depuis le XIXe 
siècle”, Transversalités, 3/2010 (N° 115), p. 27-40. www.cairn.info/revue-transversalites-
2010-3-page-27.htm 
 Portier, Philippe. L'Etat Et Les Religions En France: Une Sociologie Historique De La 
Laïcité. Rennes: Presses Universitaires De Rennes, 2016.  
 recherche”, Sociologie 2014/1 (Vol. 5), p. 13-29. 
 Roy, Olivier. Secularism confronts Islam. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007. 
 Silverstein, Paul A. Algeria in France: Transpolitics, Race, and Nation. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press. 2004. 
 Unger, Gérard. “Les débats parlementaires lors de la loi de 1905.” Matériaux pour 
l'histoire de notre temps, (n°78) 2005. p. 8-15. 
 United Nations. “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights” 
www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx 








Appendix 1. Evaluation Grid for the Online Survey 
Personal understanding of the 2004 law 
 What are the situations the respondent consider unjust or not? 
 What are the justifications given by the respondent for their perception of injustice or 
lack thereof in any, both or none of the situations? 
Perception of what is conspicuous or ostentatious 
 What are the pieces of clothing, accessories or symbols the respondent considers 
ostentatious? 
 What are the justifications given by the respondent for why they consider certain 
symbols, accessories, pieces of clothing (or none proposed) ostentatious? 
 What are the pieces of clothing, accessories or symbols the respondent would forbid in 
public spaces? 
 What are the justifications given by the respondent for why they forbid certain symbols, 
accessories or pieces of clothing (or none proposed) in public spaces? 
 Do the pieces of clothing, accessories or symbols that the respondent has considered to be 
ostentatious are also what they would forbid in public spaces? 
Personal understanding of laïcité 
 Do they agree or disagree with certain perceptions of laïcité? 
 Do they agree or disagree with certain perceptions of the headscarf? 
Crossing these three questions 
 Do respondents agreeing with a certain perception of laïcité have different responses on 
the “situation game” than other respondents? 
 Do respondents agreeing with a certain perception of laïcité also see certain symbols, 
pieces of clothing or accessories as ostentatious? 
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Appendix 2. Qualitative Interview Questions 
General Demographic Questions 
A. How old are you? 
B. Where were you born?  
a.  If born outside of France: How long have you been living in France? 
C. Where do you currently live? 
D. Do you mind me asking what is your current occupation? 
E. Concerning religion and spirituality, what would you define yourself as? 
F. How about your parents? 
a.  If the subject is religious, go to III 
b.  If the subject defines themselves as non-religious/agnostic/atheist/doesn’t 
know, go to part IV 
 
I. Questions on the 2004 Law (to religious subjects) 
A. How important is religion for you? 
B. Do you think religion is an important topic in France? For French people? 
C. Do you think this tendency has changed over the years? 
D. Do you feel comfortable exercising your religion in France? How do you feel about 
being religious in France? 
E. Has this changed over the years? Did you feel the same when you were younger? 
F. Have you ever felt discriminated against because of your religion? 
G. I would like to talk about discrimination in your school years, if you don’t mind.  
a. Have you ever felt discriminated against in middle school or high school 
because of your religion? 
b. If you do, do you mind if we talk about these incidents? 
i.  If yes: when would they happen most frequently? 
H. Do you know about the 2004 law? 
a.  If yes, what is your opinion of it? 
I. Do you think enough is done by French institutions (schools, police, lawmakers…) to 
prevent discrimination to happen in schools? Discrimination happening elsewhere? 
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a. If you don’t, how do you think things should change? What should be 
improved? 
 
II. Questions about the 2004 Law (to non-religious/atheistic/agnostic 
interviewees) 
A. What is your opinion on religion as a topic in French society today? 
B. What place do you think religion occupies in French public debates today? 
C. Was your opinion the same in the past? If not, what changed? 
D. What is your opinion of the place occupied by various religious groups in France? Do 
you think all religions are equally represented today? 
E. What do you think about the French political and legal system position towards 
religion? 
F. According to you, are there enough laws that deal with religion in France? 
G. What is your opinion on religious expression in the streets? In hospitals? In schools? 
In companies? 
H. Have you heard about the 2004 law on the prohibition of religious symbols in schools 
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Appendix 3. Images for the “What is ostentatious” question of the online survey 
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